


Sumoud – Resilience

Bringing resilience back
to the core of Palestinian
policy-making



Sumoud – Resilience

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POLICY BRIEF

Sumoud – Resilience

*Bringing resilience back to the core
of Palestinian policy-making*

March 2021

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Abbreviations

- PA: Palestinian Authority
- PLO: Palestinian Liberation Organisation
- UNRWA: The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
- EU: The European Union
- US: The United States of America
- ICC: The International Criminal Court
- WTO: World Trade Organisation

Table of Contents

Introduction	7
Methodology	8
About the Supporting Resilience Through Dialogue Project	9
Objectives.....	10
 Setting The Scene For The Scenarios.....	 11
Factors Making and Breaking Resilience	14
From the Status Quo Towards Unity.....	17
 Scenario Analysis & Recommendations.....	 22
Overview of Recommended Priorities.....	23
FIRST SCENARIO: STATUS QUO	25
SECOND SCENARIO: Collapse & Chaos	67
THIRD SCENARIO: Unity & Enhanced Resilience	76
 CONCLUSION.....	 96

Introduction

*The Arabic word **sumoud** translates into steadfastness, perseverance, and resilience. It is a term that came to denote an ideological approach and political strategy coined in the wake of the 1967 War and has defined Palestinian resistance to the occupation ever since. Today, more than half a century later, the innovative use of resilience in the realm of Palestinian policy-making is increasingly called upon. This policy document is a response to that call.*

This document is the outcome of extensive consultations with Palestinian stakeholders exploring future scenarios for the State of Palestine and the Israel-Palestine conflict. In addition to outlining possible trajectories for the status quo, the consultations explored and identified factors that could make or break Palestinian resilience. As a result of the consultations, the following three scenarios were established as potential pathways for the region:

- 1. Status Quo: Continued division, disunity, and fragility of Palestinian society.**
- 2. Collapse & Chaos: A downfall of the pillars of Palestinian society leading to a descent into chaos.**
- 3. Unity & Resilience: Move towards growing unity and enhanced resilience of Palestinian society.**

In light of conducted research and consultation, this document notes that the continuation of the current status quo is the most likely scenario for the next five years. Despite its likelihood, the scenario is all but favourable and stable. The continuation of the division, disunity, and fragility of the Palestinian society is a scenario defined by gradual deterioration, be it in terms of financial prosperity or the ability to resist the occupation. Knowing this, the Status Quo Scenario is a scenario of unresolved volatility defined by political and social factors that keep the Collapse & Chaos Scenario close.

The realisation and manifesting of all the scenarios is determined by the overarching resilience of the Palestinian society, which is, in turn, defined by external factors and their ripple effects on internal dynamics. Key factors setting

the scene for resilience building in Palestine are:

- Realisation of the attempts by the former US President Donald Trump and his administration to liquidate Palestinian rights;
- Strengthening and deepening of the Israeli military occupation;
- Further annexation of Palestinian lands and the expansion of settlements;
- Continued blockade imposed on the Gaza strip; and
- Increased normalization of relations between Israel and Arab states.

Knowing the gravity of the listed variables and the complex interlinkages determining their realisation, the urgency to adopt policies that curb a slide to collapse is clear. In other words, the urgency to implement policies that re-establish and reinforce the resilience of Palestinian society is high.

Before diving into the scenarios, it is worthwhile to underscore that resilience is not a synonym for acceptance. Resilience is strengthening the chances of achieving the scenario of unity – a scenario bringing *sumud* back to the core of Palestinian decision-making.

Methodology

This policy document is based on broad consultations supported by extensive literature review and desk research, an online survey, six sectoral policy papers on the implications of the Covid-19 crisis on Palestine, and nine dialogue workshops held in Palestine and for Palestinians living in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, within the 1948 borders, and in the diaspora. The consultations were organised and coordinated by Masarat and CMI – Martti Ahtisaari Peace Foundation in 2020 as part of the Supporting Resilience Through Dialogue Project.

The document strives to present realistic policies implementable within the frameworks set by the ongoing status quo. Despite the ambitious outlook of the document and the action-oriented nature of the recommendations, it is vital to understand, that as long as the political division between the West Bank and Gaza Strip persists, the ability for the Palestinian Authority (PA) to implement remains weak.

With this in mind, all proposed policies have been reflected against four criteria:

- Feasibility
- Acceptability

- Cost and benefit
- Fairness

The recommendations have been further examined and grouped against the notion of achievability in terms of

- Achievable as is;
- Achievable with the help of enabling and supporting elements;
- Achievable only in the case of substantive change in the current state of affairs.

The document defines the requirements, the roles of relevant stakeholders, and the mechanisms that should be put in place to transform aspirations into action.

About the Supporting Resilience Through Dialogue Project

The Supporting Palestinian Resilience Through Dialogue project is implemented by CMI and Masarat, in partnership with the Office of the Representative of the European Union in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and UNRWA. The project aims to promote Palestinian consensus and resilience by providing a platform for effective dialogues as well as by increasing international participation in the reconciliation efforts of Palestine.

CMI – Martti Ahtisaari Peace Foundation is an independent Finnish organisation that works to prevent and resolve conflicts through dialogue and mediation. Founded by Nobel Peace Laureate and former President of Finland Martti Ahtisaari in 2000, CMI has since grown to be a leader in the field of international peacemaking.

The Palestinian Centre for Policy Research and Strategic Studies – Masarat is an independent research centre dedicated to the creation of knowledge on economic, social, and cultural developments in Palestine. The centre strives to identify solution-oriented and actionable pathways contributing to the liberation of the Palestinian people.

Objectives

The primary objectives of this document are

- Establishment of national priorities and political approaches that support Palestinian resilience and the dissemination of these approaches to Palestinian decision-makers.
- Strengthening of the factors supporting Palestinian resistance in order to curb further deteriorations in the status quo.
- Identification of policy-related mechanisms and methods strengthening unity and resilience.
- Outlining of political requirements for the enhancement of resilience.
- Planting the seeds of a renaissance of the national goal of liberation.

The secondary objectives of this document are the:

- Identification of mechanisms that render the Palestinian political system supportive of resilience through partnerships between relevant policy-making actors.
- Outlining of socio-economic priorities for the strengthening of Palestinian resilience.
- Establishment of political approaches that aid in the drafting and implementation of resilience-building policies.
- Improvements in the status quo, minimized damages and losses in all fields of Palestinian society, and the gradual achievements to enable a fundamental change in the course of the status quo towards strengthened resilience and liberation.

Setting The Scene For The Scenarios

The reasons behind the fragility of Palestinian society on the one hand and its resilience against the occupation on the other, interweave political, economic, and social realms into a network of pull and push factors. These complexities have been exacerbated by the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic. The past year has further corroded the foundations of Palestinian resilience and deepened the impact of the undercurrents of volatility.

The following factors have emerged as key elements setting and shaking the cornerstones of Palestinian resilience:

1. Lack of resilience strategies

Existing strategies to build resilience have reached a dead end and no new strategies have been adopted to revitalize the Palestinian national project defined by the unity of the Palestinian cause, land, and people. If a new strategy were to be put in place, it should be built on factors that unite the Palestinians and take into account the circumstances and priorities of all Palestinian communities, be they living in the homeland, as refugees in or out of the jurisdiction of the PA, or in the diaspora.

2. Deepened occupation

The policies of the Israeli occupation defining the everyday life of the Palestinian people are a decisive factor deteriorating resistance and resilience to the situation. These policies include the maintaining and expansion of settlements, the annexation and threat of further annexation of land, control over natural and monetary resources, movement restrictions, racist policies, and the enforced separation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

3. Political impasse

The political ineffectiveness of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the PA, and the main Palestinian political forces is a clear factor deteriorating the resilience of the Palestinian political apparatuses as a whole. These negative tendencies are exacerbated by the exclusive nature of decision-making, hindering the participation of women and youth specifically, coupled with ongoing and ever-deepening domestic divisions. This ineffectiveness manifests in the weakness or absence of representative authorities, despite the decree of holding legislative

and presidential elections in summer 2021 enabling the reconstituting of the Palestine National Council and the PLO. The negative effects of the impasse are not limited to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip but extends to international refugee and diaspora communities.

4. Economic stagnation

Contemporary economic policies characterized by neoliberalism, a lack of social justice, and corruption have created an environment of zero-growth or stagnation perpetuating a weak role for the private sectors in development.

5. Alienated civil society

The weakness of the civil society institutions in Palestine is made worse by the lack of complementarity and coordination between the PA and other relevant institutions as well as their reliance on external funding. This has resulted in a divide between political structures and civil society.

6. Lack of Arab support

The absence of a unifying Arab strategy to support Palestine, its people, and its existence has led to a situation where Israel is able to intensify the expansion of its settlements and deepening the occupation. This is further exacerbated by the lack of international powers capable and willing to match the hegemony of the US in terms of sponsoring negotiations and conflict resolution initiatives.

7. Realignment of allegiances

The sharp polarisation between regional axes of power, the international implications of this polarisation, and the decline of the prominence of the Palestinian cause have led to the realignment of alliances between regional powers and Palestinian parties. This has deepened internal and international divisions leading to disunity and the blurring of a shared vision.

These factors have created an environment in which Palestinian resilience is systematically and gradually weakened. This environment is characterised by the following phenomenon:

1. Reactivity instead of pro-activity

The weakening of the PA's power and legitimacy has transformed the authority into a reactive entity. The ongoing deterioration is largely due to the framework

set forth by the Oslo Agreement further perpetuated by the collapse of the Camp David negotiations in 2000. The Agreement and the failure in negotiations transformed the PA into an agent of the occupation lacking the sovereignty to influence or control occupation-related policies. This passive state of affairs is further complicated by the dependency of the PA on the Israeli economy and the PA's inability to manage the Gaza Strip due to the political divide between Hamas and Fatah.

In order to address the current situation, the Palestinian leadership has adopted numerous decisions to review the existing political, economic, and security ties with the occupying power. However, the revisiting of relations does not equal a halt to the deterioration of the status quo on the ground nor to further deteriorations in the public's confidence in the PA. The decline of support for the PA saw its most recent dive following the PA's decision to cancel its announced withdrawal from agreements with Israel followed by a decision to resume civil and security coordination with the occupier. Despite the ensuing cracks in public support, these moves have increased the possibility of restarting negotiations under the auspice of the new US administration.

2. Political stagnation and lack of renewal

The political landscape of Palestine is defined by a lack of confidence towards political structures, particularly political parties. The gap between political leaders and their parties has continued to expand resulting in disinterest from the younger generation to step into domestic politics. The absence of political renewal and reform is also tied to the failure to hold regular elections thus creating a vicious cycle of political disempowerment.

3. Lack of a unifying vision

The deepening of the occupation and the stagnation of resistance has resulted in the blurring of a societal vision on how to resolve the occupation. The inability to form a unifying vision is tied to the domestic divide resulting in and caused by opposing perceptions regarding priorities.

4. Singularity instead of plurality

The political condition has resulted in the adoption of a single rather than an overarching solution dividing approaches on regional, sectoral, or tribal bases. This lack of coordination and unity has led to inefficiencies and lost opportunities.

5. Enablers for occupation

The lack of a vision, strategic resistance, and unity has transformed the occupation into a self-fulfilling ecosystem silencing the urgency to change the course of the status quo.

Factors Making and Breaking Resilience

The analysis and ensuing scenarios are based on a set of conditions determining the Palestinian situation. These conditions provide outlines for the analysis and elaborate on the political foundation of the three scenarios.

The six determinants setting the framework for the scenarios are:

1. Cross-cutting negative trajectories – with a transformative positive potential

Although the three scenarios are distinct, they have clear overlaps, particularly in terms of the negative elements of disunity and fragility. This means, that the risk of deterioration and the need to mitigate the events leading to such deteriorations are features shared by all scenarios. These underlying risks call for heightened focus on factors with the potential of pivoting the status quo into a state of collapse.

The risks pertinent to all scenarios enable the outlining and identification of challenges, opportunities, and approaches to mitigate the influence of these negative undercurrents. For example, the division is an extremely negative factor, but its effect can be reversed by converting division into unity and further into an opportunity.

A contemporary example of such a risk is the president's absence from the political scene. His sudden absence could precipitate and accelerate a conflict over his succession and result in chaos. Alternatively, the president's absence could initiate interventions that encourage the emergence of a new, constructive model of leadership.

Knowing this, systematic focus on rebuilding political institutions in manners ensuring the bridging of power vacuums democratically and peacefully has the potential of preventing the slide into a conflict, whilst paving the way for positive change.

2. Weakness in implementation capacity

The abilities and capacities of Palestinian society and decision-makers to achieve a radical and comprehensive renaissance of resilience is low or even non-existent in the short term. This is due to the numerous factors pushing the Palestinian cause towards collapse,

chaos, and liquidation as well as the defeat of the national movement that has led the Palestinian revolution until now.

Knowing this, one of the most prominent factors determining policymaking in the current Palestinian context relates to the need to build the capacity to take initiative and implement, instead of, for example, the need to identify desired trajectories. Building agency and strengthening the ability to act within the Palestinian context is in line with the need to initiate a comprehensive national renaissance elevating the Palestinian cause. This is to be enabled through the enhancement of existing resilience – even if gradual. The ability of the Palestinians to retake agency over their cause is a necessity for the bridging of the gap between the recommendations of this document and the facts on the ground.

3. Resilience is resistance – home and abroad

Resilience in the Palestinian context is not a synonym for creating acceptable living standards within the occupation. Rather, resilience comprises of two interlinked elements:

1. Awareness building
2. Continuation of resistance and the national struggle toward liberation

Awareness of and the continuation of the struggle for freedom is a necessity for the meeting of the immediate and long-term goals of Palestinians, be they living in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the 1967 or 1948 territories, or in refugee and diaspora communities.

The various manifestations of the Palestinian cause render the task of drafting policy recommendations complicated and reverts the task back to the underlying definition of Palestinian resilience. The notion of resilience encompasses keeping the Palestinian cause alive, based on the Palestinian people's demand for their rights and refusal to surrender, the presence of Palestinians on Palestinian national soil including in the 1948 territories, and providing a dignified life for Palestinians in their countries of refuge and diaspora.

Furthermore, resilience at home demands the continued existence of a supportive Arab position on the Palestinian cause, coupled with Arab, regional, and international action in support of Palestine. In practice, the resilience built abroad takes the shape of defying plan set forth by former US President Donald Trump and the annexation schemes of Israel, coupled with clear support for the right of the Palestinian people to establish an independent, internationally recognised state.

4. Resisting drawbacks and strengthening the positive characteristics of the status quo

Resilience and the successful strengthening of initiatives promoting of Palestinian self-determination are not possible without a critique on the status quo and the policies maintaining its fragility. There is a clear demand to improve the situation and to prevent its further deterioration, while creating opportunities for change and the emergence of positive forces that have a stake in this change. Until pro-active development is achieved, priority is to be laid on preventing deterioration, improving current conditions, and short-term objectives paving the way for the struggle of Palestinian people.

5. Unification of the Palestinian people and Palestinian cause across communities

Priority is to be laid on defining realistic policies and identifying critical approaches aimed at enhancing resilience and meeting the needs of the Palestinian people within their homeland and abroad based on official, national, and popular consensus regarding immediate national objectives. As it stands, these objectives include: the ending of the occupation and the achievement of national independence, the right of return and self-determination, and the right to establish a sovereign Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital in all the territories occupied in 1967 without renouncing the historical rights and narrative of the Palestinians. Achieving these objectives should depend on utilizing the capabilities of the Palestinian people in their struggle holistically, yet also take into consideration the circumstances and the characteristics of each Palestinian community. These considerations are to be nuanced by the prevailing facts and balances between and within local, Arab, and international powers.

6. Recognition of the fragility and complexity of the political context

An analysis regarding needed policies and changes should not overlook the challenges of the Palestinian political context. This necessitates a focus on defining the gaps and obstacles of resilience-building strategies and economic and social policies in general. Examples of such gaps include:

- Lack of institutional structures in planning, regulation, and accountability;
- Weak confidence in institutions and political forces;
- Split between institutions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip;
- Absence of or low political engagement with decision-makers;
- Weak role of civil society and its forces;
- Emergence of tribalism and individualism;

- Absence of social justice and gender equality systems;
- Political, economic, and security restrictions emanating from the Oslo Agreement;
- Absence of sovereignty and of control of resources and of the elements of development;
- Reduction of external aid; and
- Inability to plan and implement government policies and evaluate their success.

Linking each gap to their relevant actor, namely the PLO, PA or the government, political parties, the private sector, non-governmental organisations, and trade union, is a key step in moving towards a strategic policy analysis. Such analysis should also take into account the political, economic, and social factors pertaining to regional and international levels all affecting the requirements needed for implementation.

From the Status Quo Towards Unity

Palestinian resilience is a political, social, and economic concept that refers to the methods and capacities of Palestinians to confront internal and external pressure. The notion of Palestinian resilience is based on a collective national project that preserves the identity, culture, and national character of the Palestinian people wherever they exist.

In the context of the ongoing occupation, resilience manifests in the ability of Palestinians to manage and resist the asymmetries of power, the deeply rooted, multifaceted crisis, and the dearth of resources. The ultimate goal of resilience is to achieve the national objectives of freedom, independence, and return.

Resilience defining factors in the Palestinian context are:

- Acts ensuring that the Palestinian cause is kept alive in the Palestinian consciousness;
- Continued demand for Palestinian rights and basic principles;
- Refusal to surrender to the occupations and the continuation of the struggle for justice;
- Demand for and provision of a dignified life for Palestinians wherever they are;
- Enabling Palestinians to support their cause to the extent that their capabilities and circumstances allow;
- Existence of an Arab, regional, and international stand that supports the Palestinian cause.

The complexity of the listed factors in contrast to the current status quo underscores that arriving at a just solution to the Palestinian cause in accordance with the PLO's programme is difficult in the near future. Therefore, fostering the cohesion of the Palestinian people, regardless of their locations, is an essential act enabling unity and resilience in social, economic, and political strategies in the homeland and in the diaspora.

In other words, resilience relies on the rejection of the de facto state of the occupation and the strengthening of cohesion despite the challenges it imposes. Resilience is an act of redefining power balances in favour of the Palestinian cause.

Challenges on the Path Toward Resilience

The main challenges faced by initiatives seeking to build the resilience of Palestinian people include:

- Israel's targeting of Palestinian land, citizens, and resources through the maintenance and expansion of settlements, financial and political domination, the imposing of the blockade on the Gaza Strip, the threat of annexation of territories, and the imposing of mechanisms maintaining and expanding control over Palestinians.
- Dire living conditions and lack of opportunities for Palestinians in the diaspora, particularly in Lebanon and Syria, where Palestinians face a multi-faceted crisis defined by privation and marginalisation. Moreover, the diaspora living in neighbouring countries has largely been stranded from Palestinian decision-making due to the lack of oversight and support provided to them by the PLO. In addition, Palestinians living within the 1948 territories have been regarded as an internal Israeli matter, leading to their exclusion from Palestinian decision-making.
- Fragmentation of the overall Palestinian identity into secondary and regional identities. An example of this fragmentation is the dichotomy of the West Bank versus the Gaza Strip. Other related manifestations of the divide include the prevalence of political party factionalism and polarisation, the emergence of tribalism, and the replacement of the national concept of justice with individual concerns for freedom.
- Inability to utilise existing and potential resources to support the Palestinian cause due to the inter-Palestinian political divide. The negative effects of the domestic division go beyond the domestic turf and have led to the

absence of effective, comprehensive national Palestinian institutions serving the Palestinian cause, be it in the homeland or beyond. This has led to the ineffective use of resources, such as human resources, across Palestinian communities.

- Absence of a consensual, official Arab position in support of the Palestinian cause fostering unity and international support. On the contrary, cracks in the official Arab position have become a factor weakening the ability to build a unified Arab strategy that supports the unconditional rights of the Palestinians as normalisation of relations with Israel has become more widespread.
- Scattered international positions supportive of the Palestinian cause continue to weaken pathways towards a just resolution to the ongoing situation. This has resulted in failures in deterring Israeli policies regarding the occupation and its settlements as well as in reaching a solution that meets the minimum rights of Palestinians in accordance with UN resolutions and international law.
- Expanding plans to liquidate the Palestinian cause, mainly through the creeping annexation and the continued denial of the Palestinian people's rights for self-determination, independence, and the return of refugees. These dynamics have only strengthened since the announcement of the "Deal of the Century" by former US President Donald Trump.
- The current state of resilience is characterised by deep political, social, and economic fragility. A change in the unsustainable status quo demands the adoption of policies strengthening each sector of Palestinian society and the Palestinian cause as a whole. Only through systematic and holistic capacity-building measures can the acceleration of underlying negative currents be avoided.

High-risk Gaps Between Reality and Resilience

The recommendations laid out in this document address the existing gaps identified to determine the probability of the realisation of the three scenarios. The three most prominent gaps identified in the course of the research and consultations are as follows:

Gap 1: The inter-Palestinian divide splitting visions, people, and action

The continuation of the political divide between Hamas on the Gaza Strip and Fatah on the West Bank demands political, economic, and social initiatives that focus

on avoiding deteriorations in the current situation, improving it cumulatively, and overcoming all factors that could escalate the situation into a state of collapse and chaos.

These measures include policies addressing the repercussions of the Covid-19 pandemic, protecting the freedoms and rights of the Palestinian people, enhancing confidence in Palestinian political forces, activating the role and impact of the civil society, and strengthening collaborations even amidst institutional divisions.

Gap 2: The looming risk of a collapse of the PA leading to chaos, conflict, and fragmentation

The most alarming risks identified in the Chaos & Collapse Scenario relate to the vulnerabilities stemming from the potential collapse of the civil and security institutions of the PA as well as the struggle over succession for the presidency. The mitigation of these trajectories calls for pre-emptive political proposals to curb the PA's collapse, the emergence of area-specific or alternative leaderships, and armed conflict. Further policy proposals are to be directed towards the foundational elements of the national movement, civil society, and the private sector in order to prepare and manage the potential collapse.

Proposals preventing and mitigating the effects of a collapse should include approaches that direct national and popular action in the case of a comprehensive popular uprising (Intifada) and in the event of the outbreak of a large-scale confrontation. Such an escalation could result in an accelerated realisation of Israel's annexation and large-scale settlement plans coupled with forced evictions, supported by the establishment of policy infrastructures supporting their implementation. Furthermore, such deteriorations could be caused by or result in further Arab countries normalising their relations with Israel, a failure to resume negotiations under the Biden administration, a widespread confrontation in the West Bank, and the sudden absence of the Palestinian president from the political scene.

Gap 3: Failure to build resilience

The third significant gap is the ability of Palestinian communities and institutions to meet the requirements of resilience. The failure to build and deepen Palestinian resilience boils down to the fact that currently implemented policies are tied to capabilities rather than aspirations. In other words, if resilience is to be built, implemented policies are to bring about fundamental change in the structure and role of the PA and its institutions in order to make way for the rebuilding of the PLO.

In addition to the redesign of frameworks transforming aspirations into policy decisions, fundamental changes that set national consensus as the overarching vision for political, economic, and social policies is needed. These changes rest on the emergence of a national movement demanding change.

As it stands, the requirements for the named developments do not exist and are not likely to manifest in the short-term. This is due to the restoration of relations between the PA and Israel, the possibility of bringing the Palestinian-US relations back to pre-Trump levels, and the probability of the launch of direct or indirect political negotiation processes.

Scenario Analysis & Recommendations

The three scenarios:

1. **Status Quo:** Continued division, disunity, and fragility of Palestinian society.
2. **Collapse & Chaos:** Collapse of the pillars of Palestinian society leading to a descent into chaos.
3. **Unity & Enhanced Resilience:** Move towards growing unity and enhanced resilience of Palestinian society.

The identified three scenarios set the framework for the policy recommendations presented in this document. The goal of the proposed and identified policies is to draw a road map toward enhanced resilience at the official, national, private, and popular levels in Palestine. The document seeks to identify the requirements for the adoption of the recommendations, namely by making use of existing conditions and opportunities within the status quo.

The third Unity & Enhanced Resilience Scenario is the stretch goal for all recommendations. With this in mind, special emphasis has been laid on identifying the needed requirements for turning what is desired into a reality.

The recommendations address political, social, and economic spheres and have been examined against the notion of their achievability. The policy sections consist of the following structure:

1. *Strategic goal: The goal the recommended policies seek to enable.*
2. *Recommended priority policies: Policies that are to be implemented in order to realise the named goal. These policies are achievable only in the case of substantive change in the current state of affairs and subject to the identified requirements for implementation.*
3. *Probable policies: Policies that are likely to realise with slight developments in Palestinian institutions. These policies are either achievable as is or achievable with the help of enabling and supporting elements named in the requirements.*
4. *Requirements for implementation: Factors, resources, and drivers needed for the realisation of the strategic goal, the recommended priority policies, and the probable policies.*

5. *Factors defining implementation: Underlying conditions that define the implementation of the proposed policies.*

The recommended policies have been assessed according to four main indicators:

1. Direction of change demanded within Palestinian policy-making
2. Gravity of change in terms of general policy;
3. Positions of the concerned parties and relevant stakeholders;
4. Requirements for change.

The scenarios look at Palestinian resilience within a 5-year time horizon setting the end of the analysis at 2025.

Overview of Recommended Priorities

Status Quo

Political priorities

1. Creation of an environment that enables the growth of national unity and in order to prevent the political divide from turning into a permanent split
2. Enhancing confidence in the Palestinian Authority and adjusting its role and function to meet the Palestinian cause and needs of the Palestinian people
3. Enhancing national, regional, and international efforts to protect the rights of Palestinians and oppose the expansion of settlements
4. Defending the rights of Palestinian refugees and communities abroad
5. Supporting individual and national rights as well as enhancing the positive decision-making role of Palestinians living within the 1948 territories.

Economic priorities

1. A policy-led response to the effects of the state of emergency declared due to the Covid-19 pandemic.
2. Structural reforms in the Palestinian economy
3. Activation of the private sector's role in development
4. Introduction of structural amendments to the education system in order to address the needs of the labour market

Social priorities

1. Activation and creation of a comprehensive national Palestinian identity
2. The adoption of social protection policies
3. Enhancement of social integration policies
4. The democratisation of basic institutions, such as municipalities, trade unions, non-governmental civil work organizations, and student unions

Collapse & Chaos

Political priorities

1. To encourage and promote the revival of the role and influence of Palestinian political parties
2. Preventing the collapse of the PA, strengthening its role, and democratising its institutions
3. Protection of the security of Palestinian citizens

Unity & Enhanced Resilience

Political priorities

1. To rejuvenate, rebuild, and redefine a comprehensive Palestinian national project
2. Development of the function, mandate, budget, and political conduct of the PA as steering it towards an administrative and services providing entity and the transfer of the PA's political role to the PLO
3. Restoring the status of the Palestine cause as a priority at Arab and international levels

Economic policies

1. Supporting Palestinian citizens in enabling production and growth
2. The rebuilding of the Palestinian economic system and economic relations with the occupier
3. Economic resistance and rejection of economic peace approaches attempting to substitute national rights with economic growth
4. Integrated management of the Palestinian economy

Social Policies

1. Building a comprehensive Palestinian national identity
2. Utilising the capacities of the Palestinian people in the service of the national project

FIRST SCENARIO: STATUS QUO

Continued division, disunity, and fragility of Palestinian society

A number of factors support the persistence of the Status Quo Scenario and its unfolding in the coming five years. The most pertinent of these are the:

- Continuation of the political divide between Hamas and Fatah;
- Deterioration of economic and social conditions across Palestine;
- Lack of a clear international Arab position supporting the Palestinian cause;
- Deterioration of growth and stability due to the Covid-19 pandemic.

These trajectories have been further cemented into political projections following the results of the US elections and the inauguration of the new administration led by President Joe Biden. Examples of the manifestation of the continuation of the status quo include the restoration of relations between the PA and Israel and the United States, the receiving of funds collected by Israel on behalf of the PA, and the resumption of US support for the PA and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). These changes directly reduce the pressures for sudden, negative developments, push the “Deal of the Century” off the US agenda, renew hope for the resumption of negotiations, and reduce the anxiety created by the Trump administration leading to speculations regarding the emergence of alternative actors seeking a stake in Palestinian leadership.

On the other hand, a renewed failure to resume negotiations and the looming possibility of a significant annexation of land by Israel or the rolling out of settlement plans, pose a significant threat for the flaring up of tensions between Israel and Palestine. The presence of ignitable tensions creates an atmosphere pushing towards political and concrete confrontation. The possibility of a slide to chaos is thus omnipresent.

The absence of viable political alternatives, Israel’s ever-expanding settlement and annexation plans, and the persistence of the inter-Palestinian rift thus make the status quo a tinderbox. Any setbacks are likely to lead to the exacerbation of negative undercurrents creating unfortunate opportunities for the realisation of the worst-case Chaos & Collapse Scenario – the collapse of the PA and the complete fragmentation of Palestinian society.

Regardless of the undeniable risks, the Status Quo Scenario carries indirect

positive connotations. For example, the Biden administration might not see the resumption of negotiations as a priority and may opt for merely managing the conflict, and even if the “Deal of the Century” is off the table, Israel can implement annexation measures. These developments could result in domestic pressures enforcing an end to the inter-Palestinian rift or the establishment of popular movements pushing for concrete changes in the internal status quo. Even if amidst chaos, these are steps towards enhanced resilience.

Furthermore, being pushed to the brink of a collapse would present an opportunity to implement decisive preventative and cohesion-building action, which, as it stands, is subject to political will. The actual risk of a collapse could, for example, accelerate measures to partially end the divide between Hamas and Fatah through the formation of a coalition government or a unified leadership framework, while still leaving Fatah in control of the West Bank and Hamas of the Gaza Strip. The bridging of the divide could create an environment encouraging the implementation of other constructive policies, such as the rebuilding of national unity at the level of both the PLO and the PA.

Based on the indicators defining the status quo, the policy recommendations open with strategic goals reflecting the ambitions to be set in light of the current situation. The analysis then lays out policy recommendations enabling the realisation of the named goals and identifies the requirements for their implementation. It is relevant to note that success is not always immediate. All developments, regardless how gradual, pave the way for the third scenario and a renaissance of national resilience.

Political Sphere:

Paving the way towards a strengthened Palestinian political system

POLITICAL PRIORITY 1: Creation of an environment that enables the growth of national unity and in order to prevent the political divide from turning into a permanent split

Strategic goal

- Prevention of the deterioration of the current political divide into a permanent split by valorising the shared national goal of freedom, right of return, independence, and equality. This national goal is interweaved in the immediate goal of halting the expansion of Israeli settlements and establishing decisive means of resistance to the occupation.

Recommended priority policies

- Commitment to the continuation of a comprehensive national dialogue defined by wide representation from various groups, particularly women, the youth, and the diaspora. The establishment of a comprehensive dialogue demands an approach that goes beyond bilateral discussions between Fatah and Hamas and instead seeks to create exchanges that address the issues causing and maintaining political divides. The goal of the dialogues is to establish a foundation for political partnership based on consensus thus going beyond the holding of elections.
- Commitment to the holding of regular meetings among secretary generals of all political factions and expanding these meetings to include representatives from the civil society, the private sector, independent actors, and women.
- Reaching of consensus on a common political programme based on the shared goals of an independent state of Palestine on the territories occupied in 1967 and the right of return for all Palestinians. Consensus is vital for the coordination of resistance through joint action guided by clear and realistic goals. The chosen acts of resistance prioritised in the programme will not rule out specific objectives, such as a suspension to settlement expansion as a first step towards the ending of the occupation.
- Strengthened coordination and action between institutions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip limiting the effects of the political divide and preventing it

from deepening into a split. Coordination is to be extended to, for example, the Haj pilgrimage as well as the education, health, and cultural sectors.

- Ceasing of campaigns and acts of incitement, accusations, and arbitrary arrest carried out by the PA, Israel, and Hamas on the basis of political allegiances.
- Ending the use of Covid-19-related emergency laws and their unnecessary extensions without proper assessment of the state and impact of the pandemic.
- Mobilisation of Arab, regional, and international support for the Palestinian cause through reconciliation and dialogue.

Probable policies

- Prioritisation of the establishment of national unity and activation of secretary-general meetings in order to reach agreements on the construction of a unified political system at the level of the PA and the PLO. This demands consensus over a plan to bridge the political divide, setting a framework for presidential and legislative elections, as well as the reunification of civilian and security institutions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It is worthwhile to note that elections are not an end in themselves, but a means to an end tied to the respect of election results and the ratification of laws in the course of the initial sessions of the new legislative council. These measures are vital to prevent the occupations authorities from pre-empting the election results.
- Formation of a representative coalition government to improve the implementation of political initiatives in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
- Commitment to the rejection of the resumption of bilateral negotiations between the PA and Israel within the framework put in place by the US. This rejection is to be followed and supported by the convening of an international conference in accordance with the decisions set forth by the leadership of the PLO, irrespective of the nature of the new US administration. The launch of an international conference is to precede and entail the forging of consensus on a new, comprehensive political and resistance strategy.
- Holding of local elections and elections for popular unions, trade unions, universities, civil associations, and institutions as well as popular committees in refugee camps in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and abroad.
- Unifying the multiple frameworks regulating the work of Palestinian communities abroad.

- Halting of campaigns of incitement and political arrest, ending of the violation of public freedoms, and reconstitution of the Supreme Judicial Council in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This will end sanctions put forth against Gaza and address the effects of the inter-Palestinian rift.
- Reparation of Palestinian-Arab relations, particularly between and among communities, political forces, and unions that support the Palestinian cause. This is to be coupled with the mobilisation of the Arab, regional, and international stand in support of the Palestinian cause and recommended resilience-building policies.

Requirements for implementation

- Political pressure for the expansion of bilateral dialogues in the homeland and the diaspora so that they include a variety of representatives from political factions, civil society, private sector, women, and the youth.
- Enhancement and facilitation of official and unofficial dialogue between and among mid-level leaders of all political factions, academics, activists, women, youth, and the civil society. These dialogues are to pave way for joint demands regarding improvements in all sectors as well as mobilise public opinion in support of unity and a political strategy of resistance. The implementation of these dialogues requires the organising of local and national conferences home and abroad and the formation of a committee of informed individuals. The dialogues are to be supported by unionist initiatives, actions, and approaches that seek to end the inter-Palestinian rift and demand the holding of elections at universities and trade unions.
- Refinement of the role of existing political factions, the civil society, and youth group as well as other frameworks vital for the establishment of a national Palestinian movement bringing together Palestinians across the world and capable of setting demands for both sides of the Palestinian political divide. These demands are to feature the adoption of constructive policies, the mobilisation of official and popular Arab and international positions, and the rebuilding of a democratic and pluralistic Palestinian political system.

Factors defining implementation

The proposed focal policies aim to mitigate the risk of a slide into chaos and collapse. The recommended policies act as the baseline for the maintaining and gradual improvement of the status quo, yet heavily rely on joint action across

political and civil society spectrums as well as the reduction of internal and regional polarisation. The recommendations seek to create a positive atmosphere that incentivises Palestinians across continents to harness their capacities to build resilience in the struggle towards liberation. Below is a list of factors defining the realisation and implementation of the recommendations.

Hamas-Fatah divide

- Political indicators strongly influencing the persistence of the status quo are disunity and societal fragility. These political dynamics are also the main drivers behind social and economic weaknesses that create a vicious cycle of poverty, unemployment, and violence.
- The past decades have, in essence, rooted the political divide into the structures of Palestinian society enabling a single party's domination over the West Bank and another party's domination over Gaza. In addition to this, groups and sectors with stakes in political, economic, and security affairs benefit from the rift's persistence. This renders the bridging of the divide impossible and improbable. The stagnation of efforts to push for national unity is further perpetuated by the regression of alternative political forces and the civil society as well as the exclusive nature of political decision-making, specifically disavouring women and the youth. These factors add to the fragility of the status quo.
- Regardless of the divide, opportunities exist in resuming dialogue between Fatah and Hamas. Although dialogues alone will not bridge the divide, they set a baseline and open the door for the potential institutionalisation of collaboration and coordination. Gradual steps leading toward institutionalisation include the regular meetings and the formation of an interim leadership framework to be in effect until the PLO's institutions are rebuilt. This interim structure is to feature all parts of the political and social spectrum.
- Despite recent setbacks, such as the resumption of security and civilian coordination between the PA and Israel, the resumption of reconciliation efforts between Hamas and Fatah have popular support. In light of the status quo, the probability of elections remains weak, yet all steps taken towards elections are steps away from the deepening of the divide. Elections have a vital role to play in rebuilding national unity and they are a necessity for national stability and the improvement of political, economic, and social conditions across Palestine.

- Based on the analysis, both Fatah and Hamas can shoulder the price of implementing the recommended policies and are expected to make gains if they follow the proposed actions. The implementation of the recommendations will strengthen their legitimacy through enabling a unified political system as well as through addressing the official and unofficial demands to end human rights violations perpetuated by internal forces.

US-Israel-Palestine-relations

- The likelihood and timing of the implementation of the recommendations largely depend on the actions of the Biden administration. As it stands, no actions indicate the ending of the pro-Israel stance of the US and a political push towards a solution that would meet the minimum rights of the Palestinians. Knowing this, Israel is expected to continue the expansion of its settlements and the implementation of its annexation policies.
- The rift and ensuing weakness of Palestinian domestic politics directly feed into Israel's ability to deepen the occupation, continue the blockade of Gaza, and achieve more breakthroughs in normalising relations with Arab countries.
- Unfolding negative trajectories directly corrode the PA's authority. The weakening of the PA will enable the occupying force to manage the PA as its agent instead of as an equal counterpart.

International dynamics

- The PLO's weakness and its decreasing role and representative status have ripple effects beyond its immediate surroundings. For example, the deterioration of the PLO's role has a direct negative effect on the strides Palestinian refugees abroad and in the diaspora have enabled to grow international support for the Palestinian cause.
- The political rift between Fatah and Hamas has led to their unstable, even illegitimate, status in the international arena. The holding of elections is something widely supported by international actors, including the European Union (EU), and should thus be prioritised.
- The ongoing situation harms the unity of popular trade unions and related organisations at home and abroad and hinders their ability to serve the sectors and the groups they represent. The internal political rift contributes to polarisation beyond Palestine by pitting external parties and actors against each other, even in international realms, leading to inefficiencies and lost opportunities.

Risks leading to instability

- A number of dynamics exist that make the long-term persistence of the status quo improbable and an escalation of tensions risks igniting an intifada or a large-scale outbreak between Palestinian units and the occupying forces. The risk of an outbreak of violence calls for the establishment of unified leadership and the reinvigoration of the PLO's role. The possibility of an intifada-like scenario is low, yet of high impact. Dynamics with the potential of pushing the status quo towards chaos include:
- Official annexation or accelerated annexation of Palestinian territories by Israel;
- Adoption of a new pro-Israel position by the Biden administration and the exertion of pressure toward Palestinians and the international community to launch a political process that does not comply with internationally accepted principles and standards;
- Adoption of a policy of managing instead of resolving the conflict by the Biden administration;
- Expansion of the normalisation of Israeli-Arab relations following a fracture in the Arab Peace Plan.

POLITICAL PRIORITY 2: Enhancing confidence in the Palestinian Authority and adjusting its role and function to meet the Palestinian cause and needs of the Palestinian people

Strategic goal

- Initiation of a gradual process to re-establish and reconstruct political, security, and economic relations with Israel and enhance the capacity of the PA as a service providing apparatus. This entails it achieving the ability to pressure Israel to comply with international law, UN resolutions, and the agreements reached with the PLO.

Recommended priority policies

- Demands for the international community to pressure Israel to meet its commitments and agreements regarding the resolution of the conflict and

the realisation of the rights of Palestine and its people. These demands are to be disseminated through political, diplomatic, and media campaigns.

- Confronting, resisting, and hindering Israel's attempts to turn the PA into an agent of the occupation by depriving it of a political role. Approaches to use include a gradual or complete halt to security coordination with Israel.
- Separation of civilian coordination from security coordination within the PA, in order to cease security coordination and focus on civilian coordination. This will draw an end to the PA providing security services for Israel and enable it to focus on the urgent civilian needs of Palestinians, particularly in the health sector.
- Enhancement of the rule of law as well as ending acts violating public freedoms, such as arrests based on the freedom of expression or the freedom to form political allegiance. This is to be supported by drawing an end to the domination of the executive authority and security apparatus over the judiciary. These measures are to be reinforced by compliance with judiciary verdicts.
- Enhancement of the PA's role as a service provider for citizens and increasing the provision of its services through decentralisation in areas targeted by Israeli annexation

Probable policies

- Consensus on a plan regarding the process of resigning from the commitments of the Oslo Agreement and its addenda, in accordance with decisions reached by the PLO's leadership bodies. This will further entail a review of the role of the PA, its functions, commitments, and budget. The measure also aims to limit the role of the Foreign Ministry in favour of restoring the PLO's role in international forums as well as reduce the PA's security budget in favour of expanding budget allocations towards education, agriculture, and industry.
- Expansion of partnerships with the public and private sector in order to limit centralised and individual decision-making. This expansion is to lay special emphasis on the inclusion of women and youth groups in the planning and implementation processes of the PA's sectoral policies.
- Protection of public and press freedom, pluralism, and human rights, including the right of peaceful assembly and the establishment of parties and associations.

- Ending the policy of discrimination between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip perpetuated by the PA in favour of the former. Discrimination between employees of the PA in the Gaza Strip is also to be ceased both during employment as well as in retirement.
- Strengthening efforts to combat corruption at all levels, addressing the root causes of corruption, mitigating its prevalence, and implementing laws and legal procedures against those who commit acts of corruption.
- Establishment of decentralised committees to run civilian affairs in areas at risk of annexation and providing these areas and their inhabitants services in all sectors.

Requirements for implementation

- Implementation of a comprehensive national dialogue for the collection and consolidation of insights in order to formulate a vision, strategy, and programme leading to the PLO's resignation from the Oslo Agreement. The dialogue process is to be supported by the restructuring of the PA and the setting of a new political strategy based on the vision of national independence.
- Revisiting of the policies adopted by the PA in the Gaza Strip and its budget allocated to the Gaza Strip in order to achieve equality among all PA employees regardless of their location.
- Combating corruption through the strengthening of measures to implement relevant laws, establishing a system ensuring accountability, and pursuing those who commit acts of corruption.
- Inclusion of the public and private sectors as well as feminist and youth framework in the planning and implementation of the PA's policies. This includes expanding partnerships in the Higher Emergency Committee in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as well as the local and sectoral committees tasked to address the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic.

Factors defining implementation

The Palestinian political system is likely to remain fragile due to several negative trajectories, such as the deterioration of confidence in the PA and its political apparatus. It is fair to say that the political situation is worrying and the risk of sliding into chaos and violence significant. In order to successfully implement

the named policies, the role of the PA is to be redefined in order to enhance the PA's role and its ability to fulfil its mandate. Internal readjustments are to be supported by international relations that reactive the global support for the Palestinian cause.

A need to redefine the role and responsibilities of the PA

The PA was established – from the perspective of the Palestinian leadership – as an interim structure enabling the formation of an independent state of Palestine. However, Israel and a host of other actors and factors turned the means to an end. In time, this has resulted in deep mistrust between the public and the PA, exacerbated by the diminishing of the PA's powers and its ability to perform and provide the services within its mandate.

Regardless of the weak status of the PA, the likelihood of implementing the recommended policies has been strengthened by the Central Committee decisions adopted in 2015 calling for the redefining of relations with Israel. This demand was again put forth by President Mahmoud Abbas in May 2020 as he announced the cancellation of all signed agreements and all forms of coordination with Israel. The announcement was later reversed indicating that the decision to stop security coordination was not implemented in practice by the PA, but was rather used as a threat toward the occupier.

All political factions within Palestine remain committed to the decision of ceasing all forms of cooperation with Israel. Several fractions even consider the reversal of the resolution as an act of violation toward the PLO's highest leadership bodies perpetuated by individual Palestinian leaders. This despite the complete absence of conditions that would compel Israel to comply with the agreements and the absence of reciprocity in implementing commitments.

The plans and sentiments of the political factions are supported by widespread public discontent regarding the PA's reversal of its decision. According to opinion polls, the majority of Palestinians believe that the PA must change its functions and role and transfer its political mandate to the PLO. This would enable the PLO's to take the role of the national actor responsible for political and resistance decisions, and strengthen its legitimacy to represent the Palestinian people.

The same public voices demanding the elevation of the PLO, demand the effective combating of corruption both within the PA as well as the Palestinian political system as a whole.

Despite the clear demands, the economic and social factors crippling the PA's

ability to break free of its subordinate status in respect to Israel are equally clear. The structural weaknesses engraved in the Oslo Agreement also demonstrate Israel's attempts to consecrate the PA into an administrative, economic, and security apparatus implementing the occupier's agenda.

Knowing the existing complexities, some of the proposed policies aim to gradually build Palestinian capacities in order to readjust power dynamics and incrementally progress towards the cutting of ties. It is relevant to note, that such readjustments rely and depend on the redefinition of the PA itself and the distribution of power within its structures. Such restructurings could entail, for example, transferring security forces to services ministries in order to enhance the resources of those ministries and through this, enhancing the resilience of the Palestinian people.

Several schools of thought exist regarding how to change the current status and role of the PA, with the most radical being the total dissolving of the PA. More gradual alternatives include the readjustment of the PA's functions, the declaration of a State of Palestine, or announcing a founding council while still under occupation. At the same time, numerous other scenarios are being put forward, such as the one-state solution and the option of uniting the West Bank with Jordan. The two suggestions are regarded as relevant only in the case of the two-state solution becoming obsolete.

Regardless of approaches, there is a general agreement noting that the disbandment of the PA without the existence of a Palestinian alternative within the context of the PLO would enhance the likelihood of a collapse.

International pressure

Political dynamics indicate that the recommendations laid out to enhancing confidence in the PA and demanding Israel to commit to its responsibilities, will not materialise unless Palestinian, Arab, and international pressures are activated.

Such a shift in power is only possible if regional and international positions by states and organisations are aligned to support Palestinian resilience. This support will hinder attempts to create alternative leadership structures within Palestine, restore the PLO's status as the representative of the Palestinian cause, and enhance the positive influence of the Palestinians living in the 1948 territories and abroad in the resistance movement.

POLITICAL PRIORITY 3: Enhancing national, regional, and international efforts to protect the rights of Palestinians and oppose the expansion of settlements

Strategic goal

- The building of a favourable national, regional, and international political position on Palestine in support of ending the occupation and the expansion of settlements, protecting Palestinian rights as well as achieving freedom, return, independence, and equality for all Palestinians.

Recommended priority policies

- Building and maintaining a strong political movement at regional and international levels against the policies of the occupation as well as Israeli attempts to adopt the main clauses of the “Deal of the Century” seeking to diminish Palestinian rights in violation of international law and resolutions. The movement is to establish clear barriers or non-negotiables that also apply to potential policies proposed by the new US administration that set Israel’s settlements and annexation policies as de facto baselines for the resolving of the conflict.
- Refusal to resume negotiations with Israel without a halt to the expansion of settlements, land confiscation, Judaization, and the creation of facts on the ground deteriorating the rights of Palestinians.
- Creation of a political discourse adhering to the national objective of ending the Israeli occupation and the expansion of settlements based on the right of Palestinian people to practice the fundamental right of self-determination and return. This discourse is to include the demand for the right to establish an independent Palestinian state in the lands occupied in 1967 with Jerusalem as its capital. A unified political discourse will further enable the creation of a regional and international position that supports the national objectives of Palestinians.
- Enhancement of joint action with Arab states that oppose the normalisation of relations with Israel on the grounds that such normalisation violates the provisions of the Arab Peace Initiative.

Probable policies

- Creation and implementation of tangible action plans to strengthen national and popular resistance to the occupation. These plans of action are to be

supported and led by a coalition of unified national leaders, local decision-making bodies, and committees.

- Management and mitigation of the pressure to resume negotiations under US sponsorship. The act of rejecting the resumption of negotiations is to comply with the resolutions of the National and Central Committees opposing the establishment of a bilateral negotiation framework. Any attempts to resume negotiations are to adhere to the format of an international conference committed to the implementation, instead of renegotiation, of UN resolutions.
- Rebuilding of an Arab coalition that supports Palestinian rights and goes beyond fostering bilateral relations with specific Arab countries. The coordination of effort across Arab nations is key to address the fractures within the Arab League and should strive for the revival of the League's support for the Palestinian cause.
- Adoption of active popular diplomacy, or popular actions directed at international policymakers, and the resumption of relations with political parties, trade unions, and civil society organisations at Arab and international levels. These measures are to be coupled with strengthened coordination between and within movements expressing solidarity to the Palestinian people, such as boycott committees.
- Drafting and rolling out of a plan to activate and utilise Palestine's membership in international organisations and courts building on and leveraging international law and UN resolutions that support Palestinian rights. These international efforts are to be paralleled by the work done to hold Israel and its leader accountable at the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Requirements for implementation

- Strengthened national consensus on the objectives and ensuing actions striving to end the occupation as well as the sought steps leading to independence and the return of refugees. This objective is to serve as a cornerstone of the domestic and international political and media discourse seeking to increase support for the Palestinian people.
- Achievement of consensus for the formation of a unified national leadership and the formation of supporting frameworks and committees at local levels. Unified leadership is a requirement for direct and strategic action against the settlements and their expansion.

- Activation of the PLO's role at the Arab, regional, and international levels and the elevation of the PLO to lead international political strategies. The PLO is thus to establish a strategy with the aim of broadening support for the Palestine cause and expanding opposition towards the occupation, its colonial settlement, and racist policies.
- Activation and development of official Palestinian diplomacy, paralleled by popular diplomacy valorising the foundations of social justice tied to the Palestine cause whilst responding to Zionist allegations targeting the Palestinian narrative of liberty.
- Establishment of activate relations between fundamental parts of Palestinian civil society, such as non-governmental organisations, unions, professional associations, and women's and youth groups, as well as their Arab and international counterparts. The strengthening of collaboration within and across civil society groups will enable the activation of popular, international pressure and incentivise governments to reject the normalisation of relations with Israel and result in enhanced support for the rights of the Palestinian people.

Factors defining implementation

The trajectories and opportunities highlighted through the recommended policies are steps that allow a renaissance in Palestinian resilience. The proposed policies aim to strengthen internal and external political dynamics that support resistance against the occupation and utilise official, national, and popular approaches to rejecting normalisation between Arab nations and Israel. The formation of new regional and international alliances is welcomed by all Palestinian actors and has the support of the wider public too.

Most of the named policies – such as the establishment of a unified national leadership – have been theoretically adopted, yet lack realisation. This strengthens the likelihood of those policies being put into force given the right circumstances and adequate political will. Below are three political positions central to the creation of such circumstances.

1. The national Palestinian position

A national position that makes demands for the implementation and adoption of the recommended policies is vital for the creation of consensus on the establishment of a leadership framework and related popular committees capable of confronting and opposing the occupation. The need to define and

communicate a national position is gaining increased weight due to the demand to develop frameworks and forms of popular resistance in areas threatened by the expansion or establishment of settlements, the separation wall, and forced evictions. A clear national position is also a key for the gaining of support, be it financial or political, to reach the national goal of liberation and justice.

2. The international Arab position

The inauguration of Biden's administration reduces the pressures exerted by the US administration to speed up normalisation between Arab nations and Israel at the expense of the Palestine cause. The current low in normalisation processes provides the Palestinian leadership an opportunity to restore and reinstate the Palestinian cause within the Arab League as well as strengthen popular Arab leanings to favour the Palestinian cause. In the ideal case, this support will manifest as financial and political aid.

3. The international (re)position

A number of opportunities exist for the Palestinians to utilise international dynamics for the promotion of Palestinian resilience politically and economically. These opportunities lie in tapping into known international positions that reject the occupation, its settlements, and related annexation plans, as well as the policies adopted by former US President Donald Trump.

International positions to leverage include:

- Arab and Islamic countries that reject normalisation with Israel and are in favour of the Palestinian cause.
- The international Troika made of the UN, EU, and Russia, which has taken a clear stance rejecting Trump's positions and proposals for negotiations. Out of the European countries, France, Germany, Spain, and Italy are known to represent a politically positive position that demands adherence to the principles of the two-state solution. Luxembourg and Ireland are known to represent countries favouring an approach demanding decisive measures against Israel if further annexations are to occur.
- China and Russia are known for their demand for a just solution and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.
- Global solidarity movements, particularly academic circles, which support and actively strengthen Palestinian resilience and political positions. The

leveraging of these groups hinges on the establishment of official and popular diplomatic efforts that provide the movements with causes to amplify.

The persistence of Palestine's refusal to engage with Trump's vision or negotiate under US sponsorship, coupled with the activation of diplomatic effort that builds on positive international trends and demands, can act as hindrances for the US-Israeli attempts to establish a narrative based on the de facto acceptance of the occupation. However, it is necessary to note that international positions, particularly those of Russia and the EU, have not developed to the point of providing a realistic alternative to US-sponsored negotiations nor have they taken decisive measures against the occupation, related settlement policies, or annexation plans.

This lack of alternatives poses a clear risk for the realisation of the two-state solution. In order to move past inertia, strategic action is needed to enable cumulative changes in the balance of power. Such shifts in power are to be reached by linking diplomatic efforts with the restoring of relations between political parties and civil society actors, particularly in Arab and African countries. In order to be effective, these efforts should be linked to the refusal to resume bilateral negotiations under US auspices, the adoption of a resistance strategy to halt the normalisation of relations with Israel, and the strengthening of popular resistance against settler colonialism and annexation, particularly in Area C.

POLITICAL PRIORITY 4: Defending the rights of Palestinian refugees and communities abroad

Strategic goal

- Enhancing the resilience of Palestinians abroad, defending their civil and national rights, and developing their positive influence as part of the collective Palestinian struggle.

Recommended priority policies

- Adherence to the right of refugees' to return to the locations from which they were evicted from as demanded by the PLO. The implementation of this right is based on the notion that return and refugee status is a non-negotiable right and cannot be removed nor reversed. This notion is of utmost importance knowing the ongoing pursuit to liquidate UNRWA and settle refugees in respective host countries.

- Systematic coordination with UNRWA in order to avoid any reductions in its services and enable financial support to cover budgetary deficits.
- Monitoring of health conditions among refugee and Palestinian communities, especially in light of the Covid-19 pandemic. Support in health care services is to be implemented in coordination with host countries with the goal of ensuring that all refugees have access to the care they need.

Probable policies

- Developing a plan to address resettlement policies targeted at refugees in host countries and the policies that encourage their migration to other countries.
- Development of programmes to strengthen Palestinian culture, identity, and historical narratives featuring the centrality of the right of return of Palestinian refugees. These programmes are to be supported by the fostering of networks between Palestinians living within and beyond the homeland.
- Setting up of a fund in partnership with the PLO and the private sector providing support for Palestinian refugees and diaspora communities who have experienced a deterioration in living standards and employment opportunities due to the Covid-19 pandemic.

Requirements for implementation

- Restoration of the PLO's representative status and the reinforcement of its role in overseeing the affairs of Palestinian refugees and communities in host countries and in the diaspora.
- Establishment of PLO offices in locations with Palestinian populations.

Factors defining implementation

The implementation of the recommended policies rests on the depth of consensus regarding the notion of refugees and their role in the context of Palestinian national rights. The implementation of policies enhancing the rights of refugees ultimately seeks to support Palestinians living abroad by countering refugee settlement schemes and strengthening the resilience of refugees as part of the liberation struggle.

The following factors currently weaken the resilience of Palestinian refugees:

- Weak status of the PLO;

- Unappealing living conditions, poverty, and unemployment leading to high levels of immigration, particularly from Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq;
- Reductions in UNRWA's services and attempts to liquidate the entity;
- Attempts to change the legal status of Palestinian refugees;
- Attempts to permanently settle refugees outside of their homeland;
- Negative effects of the political divide between Hamas and Fatah causing polarisation within refugee camp committees, international trade unions, professional associations, and other community frameworks.

In the end, the adoption and implementation of the proposed policies defending the rights of Palestinian refugees and communities abroad depend on the existence of the political will to end the inter-Palestinian political divide. The bridging of the political rift demands the rebuilding of national representation within the framework of the PLO, allowing for the reactivation of its role in overseeing the affairs of Palestinians abroad, and formulating clear action plans that curb the attempts to settle Palestinians in host communities.

POLITICAL PRIORITY 5: Supporting individual and national rights as well as enhancing the positive decision-making role of Palestinians living within the 1948 territories.

Strategic goal

- Strengthened resilience and inclusion of Palestinians living within the 1948 territories in the national decision-making processes of Palestine.

Recommended priority policies

- Support for Palestinians living within the 1948 territories, including demands for equality and their rights as individuals as well as part of the state of Israel. This support includes resisting plans to disengage parts of the Triangle area, an area with a concentration of Arab communities adjacent to the Green Line.
- Continued support to the High Follow-up Committee and the Joint Arab List in the Knesset and actions to prevent its disintegration, especially in the case of one of its constituent party leaving the entity.

Probable policies

- Development and activation of the Higher Follow-Up Committee and the Joint List in order to prevent their collapse.
- Alignment of shared issues in support of national resilience within and beyond the Palestinian homeland.
- Supporting plans and initiatives aimed at deepening national identities and historical narratives as well as those enhancing economic cooperation, trade, and cultural exchanges between Palestinians on both sides of the Green Line.

Requirements for implementation

- Adoption of a clear strategy based on the notion that tackling the challenges faced by Palestinians living in the 1948 territories is not an Israeli issue, but an issue concerning all Palestinians and the official institutions of the PLO and the unofficial institutions made of civil society organisations.
- Implementation of a process for the inclusion of Palestinian representatives from the 1948 territories in national decision-making within the framework of the PLO and the Higher Follow-Up Committee. In order to institutionalise this process, the committee is to transform into a structure that systematically represents Palestinians in the 1948 territories.

Factors defining implementation

As long as Palestinians living in the 1948 territories remain in their villages, cities, and neighbourhoods, these individuals will represent a thorn in the flesh of the Israeli occupation. Regardless of their resilience, the racist policies perpetuated by Israel call for systematic approaches to enhance Palestinian presence and resilience within the 1948 areas. These approaches are to be supported with improvements in their standards of living and opportunities in the long-term.

The goal of the recommendations enhancing the individual and national rights of Palestinians living in the 1948 territories is to prevent and hinder Israel's objectives to deteriorate the living standards of Palestinians through, for example, the rolling out of racist laws leading to forced evictions.

Steps needed to support the resilience of Palestinians in the 1948 territories include:

- Strengthening the unity and status of the Higher Follow-Up Committee and the Joint Arab List in the Knesset;

- Supporting the participation of Palestinians in the 1948 territories in Israeli national decision-making;
- Enhancing the ties amongst Palestinians within and beyond all the communities they live in.

The recommended policies are largely in implementation phase. The realisation of some of the policies listed in this section depends on Israel's decisions to either halt or implement annexation plans, escalate its dividing policies, confiscate and destroy Palestinian property in the Negev and the Triangle area, as well as the rolling out of forced evictions. The realisation of these risk factors will define the resistance capacity of Palestinians living on both sides of the Green Line. Examples of resistance initiatives include actions taken against the occupation and ensuing confiscation of land and property, demolition of houses, and eviction plans in the 1948 and 1967 areas. Initiatives targeting the occupation are to be supported by demands calling for support for the right of return and the ending of the blockade of the Gaza Strip.

Economic Sphere:

Responding to the impact of Covid-19 by building back an economy of self-reliance and resistance

ECONOMIC PRIORITY 1: A policy-led response to the effects of the state of emergency declared due to the Covid-19 pandemic.

Strategic goal

- Increasing the effectiveness of the measures taken to enhance economic conditions in Palestine and the crafting of policies ramping up economic resilience through short-term, high-impact measures.

Recommended priority policies

- Control and mitigation of losses to the Palestinian economy to the extent possible, while curbing the spread of the Covid-19 virus. Priority is to be laid on avoiding restrictions applied to all sectors and regions and designing and implementing measures imposed on high-risk areas and sectors.
- Support for the agricultural sector in a manner that strengthens unemployment measures while meeting the conditions of social distancing. Examples of such support measures include:
 - Building agricultural roads where necessary equipment allows;
 - Reclaiming new agricultural land, particularly in the Jordan Valley and Toubas;
 - Encouraging employment in the agricultural sector and promoting agricultural initiatives, particularly through cooperatives, to reduce the rate of unemployment;
 - Increasing the efforts set forth by the Ministry of Agriculture and relevant institutions to develop the productivity and efficiency of the sector;
 - Supporting small-scale farming, particularly domestic agriculture, such as planting vegetables and fruit trees in home gardens and maintaining livestock resources as set forth by the Ministry of Agriculture and other experts.
- Provision of support and temporary relief measures for groups that have sustained the most damage among farmers, fishermen, daily workers, cooperatives, and small women-led enterprises or enterprises that specifically

support women. These relief measures can, for example, include reductions in payments for the use of a set of services, such as electricity, water, and communications.

- Allocation of financial resources in collaboration with the private sector and relevant actors, such as the Wakfet Izz Fund, for the expansion of social protection networks and the implementation of aid programmes to support groups and individuals in urgent need.
- Regulation of the internal market, including consumer protection measures, and the development of legal frameworks applying to both internal markets and imported goods in order to increase the standards and sales of Palestinian production. These measures are to be coupled with the measures banning or avoiding products and services from Israeli settlements.

Probable policies

- Substitution of imported agricultural goods and radically limiting Israel's practice of dumping products, such as potatoes, melons, carrots, onions, grapes, and dates, in the Palestinian markets by favouring domestic production.
- Encouraging the offering of long-term soft loans to small and micro-projects, particularly to those run by women. This should include the establishment of a fund managed by the public and private sectors as well as civil society organisations active in the field of micro-loans.
- Designing and implementing temporary work programmes for unemployed individuals and encouraging UNRWA to continue the development of similar programmes.
- Rolling out of tax reductions on domestic products and imposing customs tariffs on identified imported goods, such as agricultural and industrial products, to protect domestic products and strengthen their competitiveness.
- Reforming the PA's financial policy towards rationalised public spending.
- Banning Palestinians from working in Israeli settlements, whilst stimulating the employment capacity domestically and strengthening the monitoring of the legal rights of Palestinians engaged in Israeli labour markets. The ongoing monitoring carried out by the Ministry of Labour and Palestinian workers' unions should pay special attention to cases in which Palestinians

have suffered financially due to Covid-19 measures imposed by Israel on Palestinians crossing the border for work on a regular basis.

- Provision of requirements enabling a dignified life, adequate work, and strengthened resilience in refugee communities in their host countries, particularly in Lebanon and Syria. This is to be achieved through the activation of the PLO's coordination role in regards to UNRWA and other relevant actors responsible for refugees. These actions are to specifically address the impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic, the daily needs of Palestinians, and factors that encourage immigration.

Requirements for implementation

- Re-formation of the Higher Emergency Committee so that it includes representatives from the public and private sectors, trade unions, and women's and youth groups.
- Reconsiderations regarding the bases on which emergency committees are formed in order to exclude factionalism and increase the participation of all political groups and communities, especially women.
- Establishment of a specialised national group to devise a comprehensive stimulus plan in response to the economic challenges posed by the Covid-19 pandemic also tasked to revisit the PA's budget to ensure that it focuses on supporting the agricultural sector, ensures food security, and supports the most vulnerable groups.
- Restructuring the organisational build-up and programmes of the Wakfet Izz Fund by including representatives from trade and labour unions as well as the public sector in its management. The aim of this adjustment is to strengthen partnerships in the work done to determine the needs of various sectors as developing the fund's resources and programmes to go beyond the provision of aid.
- Formation of a committee of specialists, including representatives from the private sector, labour unions, and economic and legal experts tasked to investigate question regarding Palestinian labour in Israel, Palestinian workers in the settlements, the possibilities of banning work in settlements, and identifying alternative approaches and mechanisms to monitor the rights of Palestinians working in Israeli projects. This committee is to be led by the government.

Factors defining implementation

The Covid-19 pandemic caused the Palestinian economy to shrink to a state resembling that of 2015. The financial blow and the impact of imposed lockdowns call for delicate balancing between health and preventative measures on the one hand, and urgent economic stimuli on the other. This two-tiered approach could be successfully achieved through a policy response that adopts short-term, high-impact measures that go beyond immediate aid and seek to enhance resilience also in the long-term. To maximise efficiency, these measures are to bring together various parties from within the private and public sectors.

The recommended policies seek to build on the measures taken by the Palestinian government, utilising the experiences gathered from the first lockdown in March 2020. These learnings underscore the need to minimize losses to the Palestinian economy, while curbing the spread of the virus. The implemented policies are also to lay special attention to the most affected groups, supporting their resilience, enhancing the economy's ability to withstand shocks as the pandemic continues, and address the issue of those who work in Israel. The need to enhance the effectiveness of the steps taken to manage the pandemic are also needed in preparation for the PA receiving the funds withheld by Israel, the alleviation of its debt burden, or in the event of additional liquidity pumped into the Palestinian market.

ECONOMIC PRIORITY 2: Structural reforms in the Palestinian economy

Strategic goal

- Reforming the Palestinian economy to facilitate the strengthening of resilience and limiting its dependency on the Israeli economy.

Recommended priority policies

- Enhancement of government policies that support investments in local productive sectors, particularly agriculture and industry, and encourage commercial exchanges with non-Israeli markets.
- Encouragement of the industrial sector to produce goods and services for the local market as well as for export. This will enable the replacement of imports with home-produced goods and tap into the comparative advantages of Palestinian production, especially in the stone and shoe industries.
- Ramping up of campaigns to boycott goods produced in Israeli settlements and criminalising work in settlements and Palestinian investments in settlements.

- Fair distribution of economic losses, particularly in light of the Covid-19 crisis.
- Support for direct investments in information technology (IT) and communications. These investments should be allocated with the goal of increasing the IT sector's direct and indirect role in job creation.
- Attention and support to programmes in sectors most affected by the Covid-19 crisis, particularly those pertaining to women and the youth.
- Adoption of a clear position on the management of the funds that Israel collects on behalf of the PA. These efforts are to include amendments to the mechanism and commissions Israel receives. The full cancellation of such commissions would help the PA to bridge its budgetary deficit and provide additional financial liquidity for the provision of support to address the daily needs of citizens. This in turn would help stimulate the economy as a whole, particularly through the funding of the public sector and the payment of debts to the private sector.
- Increase in the attention and support given to the Palestinian labourers working in Israel in order to address legal cases and issues pertaining to their entry to and exit from their locations of work. Support directed to this group of labourers is critical due to their political alienation from Palestinian society, despite them representing the third-largest revenue source for Palestine.
- Provision of work programmes for the youth and trainings to fill existing employment opportunities.

Probable policies

- Development of the economic capacity of Palestine in order to reduce dependencies on Israel and gradually and cumulatively fill the needed requirements for the adoption of policies that would lead to economic disengagement from the occupying force. This growth could be achieved by reducing the volume of imports from Israel and focusing on opening up to neighbouring Arab markets.
- Increased investments in Area C.
- Increased efforts to secure international support for UNRWA to offset its losses and ensure that it is able to offer services for refugees in Palestine and host countries.
- Development of an economic roadmap to identify competitive advantages in each Palestinian governorate in light of clustered development policy that

divides Palestinian governorates into development clusters according to their competitive advantages, resources, institutions, and capabilities. This work is to be supported by activities strengthening industrial, agricultural, and market integration at the national level.

- Adoption of water security policies in support of productive sectors, particularly agriculture. These policies should defend Palestinian water rights and go beyond improving water quotas in accordance to the Israeli concept. The adopted policies are to be based on the notion that Palestinians have a right to own their water resources and exercise sovereignty over them.
- Support and encouragement for digital and technical sectors in order to, for example, enhance the production of digital content in Palestine.

Requirements for implementation

- Establishment of an official partnership framework enabling the development of the national economy in accordance to the goal of reaching self-sufficiency and economic disengagement from the Israeli economy.
- Redistribution of government budget allocations to increase the share of productive sectors such as agriculture, industry, and services.
- Establishment of a special private-public fund to support emerging youth projects.
- Enactment of tax exemption laws to encourage new investments.
- Establishment of a legal committee to monitor issues and attend to the affairs pertaining to Palestinian labourers working within Israel.

Factors defining implementation

The Palestinian economy faces the following challenges:

- Volatile, unsustainable, and inconsistent growth;
- Persistent unemployment and poverty;
- Internal imbalance caused by the domination of the service and commerce sectors at the expense of goods-producing sectors;
- Growing trade deficit in goods and services.

These challenges underline the fragility and fragmentation of the Palestinian

economy leading to dependency from the Israeli markets and reliance on international aid.

The recommended economic policies call for the reversal of the dynamics mounting the fragility and structural deformities pertinent to the financial outlook of Palestine. The recommended policies underscore a path towards the adoption of alternative development models capable of enhancing self-sufficiency, confronting the occupation, and enabling social justice. The recommendations highlighted in the document enjoy widespread acceptance within Palestinian society and are backed by the PLO's senior leadership. The PLO has called for a complete disengagement from the ongoing subordinate relationship with the Israeli economy.

Despite the shared vision, the frameworks of the occupation render it difficult to free the Palestinian economy from its ties to Israel as long as the occupation continues. The status quo thus requires the adoption of policies that focus on strengthening economic resilience by deepening existing capacities within the Palestinian economy.

The strengthening of existing economic capacities will enable:

1. The capacity building of the domestic economy to enable resilient growth and stability;
2. Gradual and cumulative economic disengagement, enabling a transition from the fragile status quo to a scenario of resilience.

ECONOMIC PRIORITY 3: Activation of the private sector's role in development

Strategic goal

- Expansion of the private sector's role in growth in order to strengthen Palestinian resilience.

Recommended priority policies

- Limiting of imports, particularly from Israel, and encouragement of trade exchange with neighbouring countries.
- Enhanced regulation and supervision in order to prevent monopolistic policies in the territories under the PA control, especially in the telecommunications sector.

- Compliance with minimum wage across sectors.
- Encouragement of private sector investments in productive and growing sectors, such as agriculture, and the strengthening of private sector partnerships with banks, ministries, and funds. An example of such collaborations is provided by the joint work carried out by the Ministry of Agriculture and the Employment Fund.
- Mainstreaming of the government's decision to prioritise local products in government purchases, provided that they meet set standards.
- Enhancement and strengthening of the private sector's work in the field of social responsibility, particularly in areas such as scientific research and innovation.
- Creating access to Palestinian potential for international investors, for example, through remote work, coupled with investments in sectors enabling innovations and technological growth.

Probable policies

- Advancement of partnership with the private sector in the planning and implementation of sustainable growth projects and the harnessing of competitive advantages in the agricultural, industrial, and tourism sectors at the governorate level. These steps are to be strengthened through industrial, agricultural, and market integration at the national level.
- Avoidance of cumulative government debts to the private sector through the payment of outstanding amounts and the provision of soft loans, particularly to small enterprises, with favourable repayment conditions.
- Protection of Palestinian economic institutions and the spreading of awareness regarding their role as the main players stimulating the economy during the pandemic-induced recession. These measures specifically apply to banks.

Requirements for implementation

- Establishment of a central body to represent the private sector to replace the unaligned voices from dispersed unions, associations, and councils. The structured coordination of various actors will allow for the drafting of unified perspectives and approaches creating an environment enabling and

accelerating growth. The establishment of a central body will further enhance the communication needed to foster effective private-public partnerships.

- Creation of frameworks and committees in charge of comprehensive sectoral development plans led by the private sector.

Factors defining implementation

Public support for the expansion of the role of the private sector in order to strengthen Palestinian society and its resilience is strong. However, the structural weakness of the economy demonstrates that the public sector cannot tackle existing problems without new and effective partnerships with the private sector. Yet, just like the public sector, as long as the occupation continues, the private sector's ability to address the challenges of the Palestinian society is limited.

Despite the government's ability to manage relationships between parties active in production due to its roles as an employer and substantial contributor to the GDP, its ability to bring about structural change in the Palestinian situation remains limited. Knowing this, the government remains responsible for providing a favourable legal and institutional environment for the private sector to expand its breadth in the form of investments and innovations. In order to maximize the strengths of each sector and ensure complementarity, the roles of the two sectors need to be clarified.

The adoption of the mentioned policies has the potential of building resilience by limiting the negative variables confining the growth of the Palestinian economy. Focus should hence be laid on promoting a strategy enabling disengagement from the Israeli economy by adopting policies strengthening a self-sufficient economy of resistance defined by responsibility and fairness.

ECONOMIC PRIORITY 4: Introduction of structural amendments to the education system in order to address the needs of the labour market

Strategic goal

- A transition to a modern education system that keeps up with the needs of the Palestinian markets and enables job creation and growth.

Recommended priority policies

- Expansion of the education offering of universities to go beyond knowledge transfer to feature skills building.

- Enhanced focus on vocational and technical education in response to the increased demand for skills in technology across sectors.
- Provision of equal opportunities for both sexes in education and in the labour markets.
- Strengthened coordination between the private sector and universities in order to identify the needs of the labour market. This is to be supported by the building of pedagogical capacities of teachers, particularly given the emergence of electronic education.
- Adequate response to the demands for higher salaries and improved working conditions for teachers.

Probable policies

- Establishment of more laboratories in schools and the equipping of old and new laboratories with state of the art instruments. Universities are to be encouraged to pay attention to their premises and equipment, to develop electronic learning materials, and to devise opportunities for creativity throughout the various phases of education.
- Preparation for the transition from traditional to digital universities using modern technology. The re-equipping of universities is to be coupled with the conversion of existing programmes into dual-integrated programmes, in which degrees consists of theoretical content matched with practical, hands-on work experience.
- Development of scientific research capabilities in higher education institutions relevant to resilience building in the Palestinian context. Such research topics include questions on how to develop agricultural, industrial, and commercial sectors, as well as the political, social, and cultural fields.
- Creation of a realistic plan for the provision of stable financial support for higher education institutes by the government, higher education institutions, the private sector, and civil society organisations. The purpose of such a plan is to increase and diversify the funding of education institutes through, for example, increased support from the PA's budget. The restructuring and expansion of funding sources would enable the establishment of a fund resourced through endowments and tax deductions as well as contributions from the private sector and banks.

Requirements for implementation

- Creation of a permanent coordination framework that includes representatives from the Ministry of Higher Education, the private sector, and universities tasked to identify the demands of the labour market and the needed skills to address these demands through the development of the education sector.
- Budgetary allocations to establish and equip laboratories.
- Establishment and refinement of competence standards, academic qualifications, and professional track records as selection criteria for qualified educational staff.
- Initiating voluntary and social schemes for youth to build bridges to employment.
- Regular disbursements to higher education institutions supported by a coordination plan between the government, higher education institutions, the private sector, and civil society in order to increase and diversify financial resources available for the sector. This plan is to feature the establishment of a national fund for higher education.

Factors defining implementation

There is broad support for adopting policies to develop the structure and content of school and higher education. Among these policies are steps bridging the gap between the outputs of the educational system and the demands of the labour market in ways that contribute to the efforts to reduce high unemployment rates, especially among graduates, as well as curb the impact of the push factors incentivising young professionals to migrate abroad in search of job opportunities.

The Corona pandemic and the ensuing lockdown measures valorised the importance of investing in the technology sector to meet the needs of e-education and distance learning. Such investments have the potential of supporting both vocational training as well as technical education and will support the growth of the private sector creating a virtuous cycle of development.

Social Sphere:

Creating a Palestinian identity supported by democratic institutions ensuring social protection

SOCIAL PRIORITY 1: Activation and creation of a comprehensive national Palestinian identity

Strategic goal

- Strengthening Palestinian culture and narrative enabling the formation of a comprehensive identity.

Recommended priority policies

- Rejection of exclusive regional, factional, and tribal leanings.
- Adoption of policies resisting Zionist colonialism, the Israeli occupation, and the expansion of settlements.
- Adoption of policies that disentangle partisan and extreme approaches and lay the foundation for a holistic national culture.
- Adoption of policies that reject the forced regional grouping of Palestinians resulting in the prioritisation of Ramallah and the marginalisation of other Palestinian cities. Emphasis should instead be laid on the integration of a broad base of cities and regions in political, social, and cultural action plans and initiatives.
- Adoption of Palestinian educational policies and the activation of higher education institutions to strengthen a unified national Palestinian identity based on a shared historical narrative. Universities are to become research hubs diving into solution-oriented political, cultural, and resistance topics as well as platforms for the expression of related ideas and sentiments.
- Support for initiatives pushing for the economic, cultural, and academic boycott of Israel as well as for projects focusing on establishing alternative ways to reject the occupation.

Probable policies

- Regaining of the national identity and the re-establishment of the concept of a together-bound, contemporary Palestinian people.
- Formulation of a unifying, consensus-based national vision built on notions shared across communities home and abroad.
- Enhancement of a comprehensive national identity based on the revival of social, cultural, and political heritage.
- Adoption of policies based on the principles of democracy, social justice, the rule of law, and institution building.
- Integration of the concepts of national identity into the educational system at primary, secondary and university levels.
- Decisive reduction of marginalisation of Palestinian cities, coupled with the implementation of a national dialogue on positive discrimination and quota systems. The aim of this dialogue is to amend social practices now based on geographical and factional biases.
- Support to Palestinian media and parties in establishing approaches the focus on the unity of the people of Palestine.
- Drafting and rolling out of an official, cross-cutting political discourse based on the narrative of liberation coupled with the formulation of programmes to strengthen joint action and networking amongst Palestinians in the social and cultural spheres within the homeland and abroad.

Requirements for implementation

- Adjustments and amendments to the Palestinian educational curricula to bring them in line with the values of unity. These adjustments are to strengthen social solidarity initiatives and movements confronting schemes aimed at liquidating Palestinian national rights.
- Changes in official Palestinian political discourse in order to base it on a narrative of liberation and resistance.
- Refinement in Palestinian political culture to accommodate and accept differences.

- Strengthening of dialogue and networking to build a cross-cutting national force that believes in a common identity, a shared historical narrative, the values of democracy and pluralism, and women's and human rights as its guiding force.

Factors defining implementation

Internal dynamics indicate that the recommended policies are in the process of being adopted. This notion is supported by the widely shared notion of the dangers of the negative and dividing effects of factional fanaticism and geographical favouritism. Despite the shared understanding regarding the risks of further divisions, the emergence of several protest movements aimed at establishing Palestinian forces that transcend the narrow boundaries of contemporary party-politics cannot be ignored. These dynamics are to be kept front of mind as drafting policies leading towards a comprehensive national identity.

Attention to domestic developments should not divert attention away from international trends. The emergence of external initiatives targeting the Palestinian narrative in the form of, for example, the intellectualising of Zionist narratives or the normalisation of relations between Arab nations and Israel, should be addressed through decisive strategies lifting the Palestinian cause to the forefront.

SOCIAL PRIORITY 2: The adoption of social protection policies

Strategic goal

- Enhancing the safety of Palestinians through addressing impunity and the basic needs of individuals.

Recommended policies

- Ceasing arbitrary arrests and the infringements of individual and collective freedoms.
- Strengthening the rule of law in protecting the rights of individuals, combating crime and murder, and addressing the illegal carrying of weapons.
- Combating drug trafficking and use.
- Directing resources to issues pertaining to the daily lives of Palestinian refugees abroad, particularly in Lebanon and Syria.

- Sponsoring and supporting initiatives targeted at decreasing youth unemployment and supporting the employment and career development of women.

Probable policies

- Intensification of reform efforts at all judicial, administrative, and institutional levels including the strengthening of the independence of the judiciary, curbing divisions in judicial work within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and combating corruption.
- Expansion of social safety nets by supporting institutions that offer social and care services in marginalised and poor communities. This is to include the increase and restructuring of resources allocated to the Ministry of Social Affairs allowing more effective and broader humanitarian and emergency aid to families in need. Moreover, aid should not only be limited to relief, but should focus on supporting targeted families in establishing income-generating projects.
- Broadening of health insurance programmes for citizens with limited income in exchange for nominal fees, particularly those recently impoverished by the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic.
- Reductions to the prices of certain public services, such as transport, housing, and health and adoption of social justice policies addressing living costs and conditions in Palestinian territories.
- Adoption of policies improving general income and its fair distribution across Palestine.
- Establishment of emergency employment programmes for the impoverished and those who have lost their jobs during and due to the Covid-19 pandemic in the Palestinian territories and amongst Palestinian refugees abroad. Such programmes are to be implemented in collaboration with the private sector and UNRWA.
- Increased efforts to regulate the internal market, protect the consumer, develop a regulatory legal framework, resist and ban products and services from Israeli settlements, and activate regulation of the markets and imported goods.
- Supporting small innovative youth projects.

Requirements for implementation

- Adoption of new minimum wage legislation.
- Enactment of tax exemptions for small innovative youth projects.
- Provision of banking facilities for youth in order to access government guaranteed loans.
- Strict enforcement of the law that prohibits carrying weapons.
- Cancellation of the law on electronic crime violating freedom of expression through social media.
- Initiation and implementation of a broad dialogue regarding the restructuring of the social protection network in the short term, including an agreement on sustainable long-term social protection systems, particularly regarding the issuing of a Social Security Law.

Factors defining implementation

The general direction of Palestinian policy-making aimed at enhancing social protection indicates that the achievement of the highlighted policies is possible. Several laws, such as the Minimum Wage Law and the Licensing of Arms and Ammunition Law, have been enacted, yet the implementation of both has been a failure. The Minimum Wage Law has not been put in force and research shows that every third private sector worker receives a salary that is below the minimum wage. The Licensing of Arms and Ammunition Law has reduced the number of arms in circulation, but it has not ended their ownership nor their use, particularly in areas out of the control of the PA. In addition, disagreements over the Social Security Law have escalated into a protest movement calling for consensus regarding the law and its implementation.

More than half of the income of an average Palestinian worker is used to cover basic needs. With this in mind, it is clear that enhancing the resilience of Palestinian individuals demands the strengthening of the economic and social stability of Palestinian society. Moreover, the discrepancy between wages earned in Israel to those earned in territories controlled by the PA is perpetuating the sentiment of social injustice within the Palestinian society. If unity and enhanced resilience are a goal, these are factors to be addressed.

SOCIAL PRIORITY 3: Enhancement of social integration policies

Strategic goal

- Including marginalised groups in the drafting of Palestinian public policy and in political decision-making

Recommended priority policies

- Strengthening of the role of the youth in official Palestinian institutions and political factions.
- Strengthening of the participation of women in various official institutions, national bodies, and in elections at all levels, coupled with decisive action to combat gender-based discrimination.
- Establishment and broadening of fair employment opportunities in the public sector.
- Ensuring that Palestinian citizenship remains the defining factor in inclusion, instead of political leanings, tribal affiliation, or religion.
- Commitment to equal pay for all genders.

Probable policies

- Drafting of policies that increase social integration in all sectors of Palestinian society and enhance inclusive decision-making.
- Compliance with the PLO's decisions supporting the political participation of women in decision-making and electoral lists. This is to be coupled with the combating of discrimination and inequality between the sexes through, for example, developing programmes to support women and families.
- Support for youth groups developing geographically and politically cross-cutting initiatives that express their aspirations and address their struggles. This demands protecting the freedom to create and implement such activities and campaigns.
- Protection of the rights of people with disabilities or special needs in terms of education, work, and healthcare. In addition to providing access to services ensuring the integration of these individuals, integration must be based on

equal opportunities and the provision of programmes that qualify and include people with disabilities in productive activities.

- Development and expansion of social care services so that they include the poorest and most vulnerable segments of society in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as well Palestinian refugees in host countries.
- Adoption of social integration policies and programmes created by civil society institutions.

Requirements for implementation

- Ending discrimination amongst job seekers through, for example, ending the use of security service reports as part of selection processes leading to the exclusion of some applicants.
- Lowering of age limits and other criteria for running for election.
- Enactment of laws against wage discrimination.
- Amendment of educational curricula to reflect inclusivity and social integration by, for example, tackling stereotypical images of women, promoting equality between the sexes, mitigating traditions that strengthen discrimination, accommodating individuals with special needs, and raising awareness of children's rights.
- Strengthening of the role of women's organisations and legal and civil bodies to build coalitions that support equality between the sexes and protect women against violence. This is to be supported by the implementation of dialogues between all parties relevant to the Family Protection Law. The law's objective is to protect women, children, and families from violence and to support the empowerment of survivors, while holding perpetrators accountable.

Factors defining implementation

Social integration is linked to the establishment of a society based on citizenship. Marginalisation is the result of social injustice that takes the form of the alienation of set groups, yet deteriorating the resilience of the community as a whole. The listed policies seek to support social cohesion against the Israeli occupation and ensuing economic and social fragilities as well as enhance social integration in order to improve social security among all citizens. These measures all lay the foundations for strengthened confidence towards the PA.

Social Priority 4: The democratisation of basic institutions, such as municipalities, trade unions, non-governmental civil work organizations, and student unions

Strategic goal

- Increasing the efficiency of basic institutions and rendering them socially representative of Palestine.

Recommended priority policies

- Activation of Palestinian local government institutions and boosting the efficiency of their services to citizens.
- Strengthening accountability in municipalities.
- Holding of regular municipal and local elections in the West Bank and increasing decentralized decision-making by expanding the mandates of local leaders. The goal of the policy is to enhance the legitimacy of such councils as service providers for the management of citizens' affairs at local levels and avoid a descent into chaos in the event of the weakening or fracturing of central authorities.
- Enhancement of the role of women and youth in municipal decision-making by going beyond representation and quotas.
- Holding of regular elections in civic institutions and charitable societies.
- Activation of student councils at universities and teachers' associations and formally committing these groups to regular council elections.
- Allowing the formation of politically independent student blocs not affiliated with existing political parties at universities.

Probable policies

- Activation of professional associations, unions, and public associations, particularly in regard to the drafting of public policies.
- Encouragement of initiatives to unify unions and professional associations and structure them along democratic lines through elections.
- Achievement of consensus on municipal and local council elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

- Holding of regular student council elections at all universities in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
- Formation of a student body to represent university students within territories managed by the PA and provision of incentives to re-establish the General Union of Palestinian Students.

Requirements for implementation

- Agreement on a code of honour amongst Palestinian political factions on the need to hold democratic elections and the gradual establishment of an appropriate environment for elections.
- Adjustment of the law regulating student councils so that the formation of student groups is not limited to agreements between political factions.
- Activation of the role of youth frameworks and groups in the building of bridges between Palestinian students within the homeland and abroad in order to support initiatives that enable the rebuilding of the Palestinian student movement.
- Launching of an informal dialogue among labour union activists in order to build consensus on the needed steps to reunify labour unions.
- Monitoring of civic organisations not committed to holding regular elections and establishing accountability measures to ensure rule-based decision-making.
- Cancellation of the principle of appointing municipal authorities in the West Bank and mayors in the Gaza Strip without due democratic processes or elections.

Factors defining implementation

Recent policy developments support the implementation of the recommendations laid out under the priority of democratising basic institutions. Deficiencies crippling the effectiveness of existing policies are largely tied to the prevailing political divide between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Furthermore, as it stands, most municipal councils are formed through the appointment of members or by consensus-based decision-making resulting in non-democratically established leadership bodies characterized by the uneven representation of the various communities of Palestine as well as women and youth.

The same applies to elections at universities, currently largely irregular in nature. Despite the current lack of elections, the possibility to adopt policies that make regular elections compulsory exists. Furthermore, the political divide between Hamas and Fatah continues to undermine initiatives calling for the revival of the role of the Union of Student Councils, the reconstruction of the General Union of Palestinian Students, and related international branches. These limitations weaken the formation of a Palestinian student movement with the potential of regaining a leading role in the national struggle. The establishment of such a body depends on the degree of awareness amongst youth and student councils on their distinctive role in the liberation struggle and the recognition given to these bodies in decision-making at large.

The likelihood of implementing the named policies depends on the extent of progress made in inter-Palestinian reconciliation. These steps should begin with administrative coordination between professional unions and associations progressively expanding towards the reunification of their political and administrative activities.

SECOND SCENARIO: Collapse & Chaos

The second scenario is a scenario in which underlying vulnerabilities of the status quo lead to the collapse of the pillars of Palestinian society resulting in a descent into chaos. The Collapse & Chaos Scenario rests on the assumption that the negative variables tied to the status quo persist and deepen eventually manifesting in a chain of effects that catastrophically deteriorates the resilience of the Palestinian people and the future of their cause.

Risks with the potential of instigating the realisation of the Collapse & Chaos Scenario include:

- Annexation of large parts of the West Bank by Israel;
- Sudden absence of President Abbas without prior institutional arrangements guaranteeing the democratic and coordinated filling of the political vacuum;
- Lack of renewal of the role and institutions of the PLO and other elements of civil society.

The realisation of any of the mentioned factors has the potential of precipitating an accelerated or even sudden breakdown of the Palestinian society and igniting conflict amongst the Palestinian power holders and their tribal and regional affiliates. This could manifest in the emergence of actors representing an alternative to the current Palestinian leadership or lead to the acceptance of the de facto colonialist status quo. The realisation of the risks would most likely be coupled with a deepened intervention from Israel into Area A.

Despite the destructive gravity of the known risks, their realisation comes with the possibility of pulling the political landscape in the opposite direction – towards greater unity. A political and on the ground confrontation could result in an even stronger manifestation of the occupation, a dead-end for the envisioned settlement of the conflict, and the final failure of the PA to transition into an independent state. Yet, the forces and groups participating in the confrontation have the opportunity of transforming the collapse into an uprising or intifada resulting in unity and a spontaneous re-organisation of national leadership.

In light of the political, economic, and social indicators setting the outlines for the status quo, the identified risks interact with the following variables:

1. Israel's continued attempts to liquidate and disintegrate the PA

Israel continues to enact policies seeking to limit the powers of the PA and divide Palestinian society by

- a. Turning the PA into an administrative, economic, and security agent serving the occupation and acting as the final coordinating body of an irreversible annexation.
- b. Weakening the PA's ability to challenge the status quo through the expansion of settlements.
- c. Expanding the powers of Israel's Civil Administration by encouraging the establishment of centres of power backed by armed loyalists or local tribes deepening the Palestinian political divide. If Hamas accepts the terms set forth by Israel regarding a long-term truce or if an attack to overthrow Hamas or weaken it occurs, Israel may attempt to replicate a similar strategy with the PA in the West Bank.

2. Growth of Arab countries normalising relations with Israel

The growing normalisation of relations between Israel and several Arab countries indicates an increasing push from Arab and international actors to pressure the PA to accept the trajectory of regional peace without Israel's commitment to the rights of the Palestinian people. These interests expressed by a set of countries might manifest in attempts to dissolve the PA and replace it with an authority expressing less resistance to the occupation and the asymmetry of power.

The ongoing dynamics and political repositionings are driven by the need to break free of the political and moral burden of the Palestinian cause and the continued rejection by Palestinian leaders to normalise relations with Israel in order to resolve the conflict. It is worth noting, that the general assumption is that the political leanings of Arab countries are likely to worsen due to the PA's resumption of security and civil coordination with Israel, the continued difficulties in achieving inter-Palestinian reconciliation, and the return of Palestinian ambassadors to the countries that have normalisation agreements with Israel. These signs demonstrate an increased willingness to co-exist with Arab countries despite the normalisation of relations and the hope of a resumption of negotiations with Israel under the Biden administration.

3. Deepening of domestic divisions and growth of new actors

Domestic variables impacting political dynamics include:

- a. Political and cultural elites that promote a notion of despair calling for an acceptance of the status quo;
- b. Groups with economic ties to the occupation benefiting from economic peace projects or projects that seek to resolve the conflict by replacing the national rights of Palestinians by improving their living and economic conditions;

- c. Armed groups linked to and affiliated with power holders preparing to engage in a struggle for leadership.

It is worthwhile to zoom in on the last political dynamics by noting that even though the interests and motives of the armed groups differ, the groups share the pursuit of preparing for the next phase of the conflict by amassing weapons and forging alliances beyond the official establishment. Even though only preparing for what is to come, these acts contribute to the ongoing weakening of the central authority and deepen domestic polarisation. This in turn creates an environment that fosters alliances and shared interests among alternative groupings as they prepare for, for example, the sudden exit of the president from the political stage.

It is worthwhile to note, that the realisation of the Chaos & Collapse Scenario will not happen in a vacuum. Its realisation is deeply interweaved within regional developments and could be significantly accelerated in the instance of a regional war, which Israel could exploit for its benefit.

Setting the Scene for Policies Amidst Chaos

When it comes to pathways forward, Palestine is faced with a need to move from the mitigation of a collapse to the prevention of a collapse. Knowing the fragility and unsustainable nature of the status quo, effective strategies that enable political, economic, and social capacity-building and the gradual enhancement of Palestinian resilience are urgently demanded.

A vital question to tackle as preparing for a potential descent to chaos relates to who to include in decision-making. The scenario entails the assumed fragmentation of the PA's institutions rendering them unable to deliver services to citizens and lead the process of recovery. The looming risk of a sudden outbreak of instability calls for the urgent crafting of pathways and processes enabling adjustments to the roles of relevant stakeholders, of whom the PLO stands above others. Other stakeholders whose coordination and collaboration are vital both in preventing and managing a collapse include other political groups and factions, civil society actors, and the private sector.

The urgency to bring recommendations to practice is real yet no guarantees exist for the prevention of the collapse of the Palestinian society even if decisive action is taken. Factors creating underlying and unresolved fragilities risking the effectiveness of preventative measures include:

- PA's known inability to establish an independent Palestinian state;
- Diminished public confidence regarding the possibility of achieving a two-state solution through a negotiated settlement;

- Absence of an alternative strategy for peace;
- Israel's ongoing actions that render the two-state solution unrealistic.

In light of the status quo, the probable trajectory for the region is an ongoing and unresolved conflict that pities Palestinian resilience and resistance against the ever-deepening Israeli occupation.

If an alternative trajectory is to be established, the following goals are to guide policy-making:

- Establishment of a strong civil society to match the weak PA: The PA will not increase its power in the next five years and will remain weak even if collapse is avoided. This calls for the establishment of a strong civil society ecosystem as the foundational force of resilience.
- Maintenance of social structures: There is a clear need to strengthen the role of social structures, particularly Palestinian political forces, civil institutions, and trade unions to act as buffers for instability providing networks and operational frameworks that maintain cohesion in the event of chaos.
- Democratisation of political institutions: Democratisation of decision-making is to be set as a priority within the PLO, the PA, and society at large in order to build unified, agile, and resilient communities that serve their people.
- Activation of the rule of law: The rule of law is to be brought to the centre of policy-making in order to enhance stability and predictability as well as to combat corruption, crime, and the possession of unlicensed arms.

Political Sphere:

Preventing a collapse by promoting democratic change

POLITICAL PRIORITY 1: To encourage and promote the revival of the role and influence of Palestinian political parties

Strategic goal

- To prevent community institutions and families from being drawn into a state of chaos.

Recommended priority policies

- Initiation of a dialogue between nationalistic and Islamic forces to agree on a common agenda for the reunification of the Palestinian political system on the basis of a national political programme and the principles of democracy.
- Setting the principle of consensual democracy as the basis of unified action within the institutions of the PLO and the PA, irrespective of whether or not conditions for holding comprehensive, free, and democratic elections exist.
- Adoption of a media strategy defined by general human values, unity, and Palestinian nationalism.
- Establishment and implementation of a popular resistance programme against the practices of the occupation, including the formation of unified national leadership and local communities that follow its guidance.
- Enhancement of the role of the youth so that their reach and networks transcend geography and build bridges to Palestinian youth groups outside Palestine.
- Support for the work of Palestinian civil institutions that enhance social integration and the culture of unity.
- Establishment of frameworks and mechanisms to fill the political vacuum at the PA-level in the event of the president's absence if the holding of elections becomes impossible or if the legislative council is dissolved.
- Adoption of a policy for the Fatah movement that addresses internal antagonistic forces from within the movement and preserves consensus. Enhanced unity will prevent the emergence of a conflict over leadership succession of the movement, the PA, and the PLO.

- Neutralisation and management of the impact of Arab actors trying to influence the situation in Palestine in an effort to legitimize their own policies and agendas. Special attention should be given to countries that have normalised relations with Israel and countries that have expressed intentions to do so.

Probable policies

- Establishment of Third Way or alternative bodies, committees, and national forces that transcend contemporary geographical areas and political parties. These bodies are to comprise of Palestinian political figures, independents, and innovators and are also to act as springboards for young change-makers into leading roles in society.
- Establishment of bodies, units, and departments within municipalities transcending and bridging parties and family divisions and supporting civic work and social harmony.
- Mending of relations between the PA and leaders in Palestinian refugee camps.
- Activation of civil society institutions supported by efforts to democratise their processes and decision-making. This is to enable the spreading of a social and political culture based on tolerance and unity curbing the impacts of a culture perpetuating violence and exclusion.

Requirements for implementation

- Halting of targeted security campaigns by the authorities in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip against rivalling political groups.
- Mobilisation of stakeholders with the ability to incentivise civil society actors to organise conferences, seminars, workshops, sit-ins, and protests at the national and local levels within Palestinian communities at home and abroad. These joint efforts are to build unity to confront the occupation as well as to enable the drafting of solutions to address the impacts of the ongoing occupation.
- Joint political, social, economic, and cultural initiatives led by civil society organisations and youth groups from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
- Favouring of political and conciliatory settlements and the forming of

coalitions when managing opposing opinions instead of relying on internal security practices to address disputes.

Factors defining implementation

Many of the recommended priorities are currently being discussed on various levels of Palestinian policy-making. What is now expected, is the transformation of discussions into actual public policies supported with implementation plans and related programmes.

The implementation of the recommended policies is thus theoretically possible, yet rely on significant changes. These changes include the bridging of the political divide between Hamas and Fatah, the strengthening of national unity, and the renewal of Palestinian leadership. The demanded changes come with a need to renegotiate existing power structures in order to pave the way for novel groups, parties, and actors taking a role in decision-making home and abroad.

POLITICAL PRIORITY 2: Preventing the collapse of the PA, strengthening its role, and democratising its institutions

Strategic goal

- Strengthening the democratic foundation of the PA's institutions and supporting the dissemination of the PA's policies in Area C.

Recommended priority policies

- Combatting corruption and nepotism within the PA.
- Holding of regular municipal and local council elections.
- Democratisation of professional and trade unions and strengthening their ability and effectiveness in devising public policies.
- Rebuilding of a unified, independent, democratic, and up-to-date judicial system.
- Support for agricultural and housing projects in Area C.
- Support for civil institutions active in Area C.
- Reduction of staple food prices in the Palestinian market.

Probable policies

- Transfer of power and responsibilities from the PA to the PLO. Strengthening the PA's role as an institution that addresses and successfully meets the needs of citizens.
- Strengthening of reconciliation measures by establishing unified leadership bringing all political factions together and ending the inter-Palestinian divide. The bridging of the political rift calls for an agreement on a unifying national agenda and consensus on an action plan to bridge the divide, paving the way for legislative, presidential, and national council elections.
- Formation of popular committees in areas bordering Israeli settlements and communities in Area C.

Factors defining implementation

Widespread support for the strengthening of the role of the PA as a service provider and lead actor managing the affairs of the Palestinian society exists. Yet, shortfalls in meeting the needs of the groups most vulnerable to the occupation have become a significant factor deteriorating confidence in the authority.

Investments strengthening the PA's role in marginalised areas, coupled with the activation of the civil sector are needed in order to prevent the collapse of the PA, strengthen its role, and democratise its institutions. A stronger PA is a step towards coordinated resilience-building enabling systematic resistance to the occupation and further annexations of Palestinian land.

POLITICAL PRIORITY 3: Protection of the security of Palestinian citizens

Strategic goal

- Enhancing the personal and social security of Palestinian citizens.

Recommended priority policies

- Adoption of policies that guarantee the economic security of Palestinian citizens by ensuring appropriate income to meet their daily needs. These needs include housing, education, health, and transport.
- Decisive measures to reduce unemployment among recent graduates by adopting fair employment policies and supporting small and growing enterprises.

- Strengthening of the Palestinian judiciary and the confidence of Palestinian citizens in the PA's ability to govern by the rule of law.
- Implementation of strict penalties for the illegal purchase and use of weapons, especially when used to terrorise citizens.

Requirements for implementation

- Activation of committees that protect consumer rights and ensuring that these committees have the capacity to advise the government.
- Enactment of laws to penalise those who break minimum wage standards coupled with the strengthening and realisation of gender equality in the private sector.
- Drafting of a code of honour on social responsibility.

Factors defining implementation

The general sentiment expressed by Palestinian society is that citizens do not feel physically nor socially secure. The level of Palestinian citizens' sense of security stood at only 45% and confidence in the judiciary at 63%, according to a public opinion poll run in 2019 by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey (Poll No. 73).

The figures are a clear call for decisive actions towards the establishment of a democratic system governed by the rule of law able to implement fair judicial rulings. These rulings are to specifically target the following levels of violations and shortcomings in order to expand the feeling of safety and trust in the justice system:

1. Non-compliance with the law;
2. Lack of proper implementation of laws in courts;
3. Inefficiencies in implementing laws on all levels.

The probability of implementing policies seeking to protect the security of Palestinian citizens hinges on the vision of the political order sought by decision-makers.

THIRD SCENARIO:

Unity & Enhanced Resilience

The policy recommendations tied to the third Unity & Enhanced Resilience scenario are based on radical policy solutions enabling substantial growth in Palestinian resilience. Unlike the first and second scenario, the third scenario has no recommendations – only requirements. As the scenario represents the recommended and preferred outcome, focus has been laid on the elements demanded to enable its realisation.

The requirements highlighted in this section build on the following premises:

1. The proposed and demanded changes on all levels of Palestinian public policy;
2. The required policies and initiatives are not limited to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but involve the mobilization of all Palestinians in their communities within the homeland and abroad;
3. Many of the required policies call for changes in the roles of political actors. In some cases this demands new parameters, roles, and frameworks for existing and traditional structures;
4. The implementation of the recommended policies takes into account the relative distribution of power, including balancing profit and loss on the basis of reducing costs for Palestinians and increasing costs for the occupier. The requirements have been listed in awareness of the unavoidable costs demanded by developments leading to resilience, liberation, and independence.
5. The successful implementation of the required policies calls for a changes in the political philosophies and principles governing Palestinian public policy. The demanded policies touch two tracks of policy-making:
 - a. The process of drafting policies and initiating action.
 - b. The perspectives affecting the design and implementation of public policy, particularly in regard to relationships with external actors, most notably Israel and other regional and international players.

Setting a New Framework for Resilience

The mechanisms of Palestinian policy-making are burdened by constraints set by the current political, economic, and security agreements with Israel. Moreover,

the structures of the Palestinian political system come with a host of complications inhibiting change. The most prominent of these are:

- **Erosion of the PLO's representative standing** and the decline of its role within Palestine and in international realms, resulting in its diminished authority reaching only parts of the West Bank.
- **Political and institutional division and single-party domination** in official institutions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and the prevalence of authoritarianism, corruption, abuse of power, and the violation of public freedoms.
- **Absence of a comprehensive national project** and a national political and resistance strategy that represents all Palestinians.
- **Exclusive and marginal approaches to decision-making** in various sectors coupled with the absence and limited role of national institutions.
- **Ineffectiveness of political forces**, the absence of democracy within political parties, and the lack of renewal in their leadership bodies.
- **Reduced opportunities for women and the youth** to participate in civil society, due to the prevalence of the mentioned complications.

The named complications and ensuing policy practices have exacerbated imbalances in all levels of social integration and contributed to the overall fragmentation of the Palestinian national identity.

However, devising policies in light of the desired scenario of enhanced resilience does not mean that the recommended policies are idealistic in nature. On the contrary, in the context of Palestinian liberation, they reflect the change required, and their manifestation is an existential necessity for the advancement of the national goal of resilience, the ending of the occupation, and achievement of independence.

In light of the Enhanced Resilience Scenario, the following three priorities rise above the rest:

Politically: Rebuilding of the Palestinian national project supported by inclusive national institutions

The rebuilding of the national project does not mean creating the Palestinian project anew, but rather entails the renewal of consensus regarding the existing national project. The aim of this renewal is to enable Palestinian's to exercise the right of self-determination regardless of their location and community, enhancing

the resilience and unity needed to end the occupation. The deepening of unity is to be enacted in parallel to the immediate goal of independence through the establishment of a Palestinian state in all the territories occupied in 1967, with Jerusalem as its capital. The goal of independence is to ensure the return of refugees to their homes and properties.

However, the national project is beset by challenges requiring a reset in the conditions under which Palestinians live today, effective national institutions able to represent all Palestinians, and the active use of the various capabilities of the Palestinian people wherever they may be.

Economically: Fulfilling the demands of self-reliance

A resilient economy capable of resistance and liberation is an economy defined by self-reliance. The policies pursued under the Oslo Agreement or by the PA have led to structural imbalances that damaged the resilience of Palestinian citizens and even increased their dependency on the occupation. Existing economic policies have contributed to an increase in poverty and unemployment rates, and created an environment that encourages young people to emigrate in search of better opportunities. This is most notably seen in the Gaza Strip.

Socially: Ensuring inclusive Palestinian decision-making

The goal of the proposed policies seeking to enable social reforms is to ensure the unity of the Palestinian people and to utilise their capacities in the service of the national project. This priority is of utmost importance due to the geographical and regional fragmentation caused by the Oslo Agreement and the further marginalisation of Palestinians living in the diaspora and in the 1948 territories.

Political Sphere:

Rebuilding a comprehensive national project supported by national institutions that represent all Palestinians and bringing the Palestine cause to global attention

The policies recommended as part of the Enhanced Resilience Scenario pertain to two different levels of Palestinian decision-making: the PA and the PLO.

The underlying political challenges regarding the two are:

- Respective roles of the PLO and the PA;
- Relationship between the two players and the ensuing power-struggle;
- Limitations set by the Oslo Agreement that hinders aligning the PA with the resistance movement and the goal of liberation;
- Polarisation between Fatah and Hamas weakening both actors.

The policies laid out in the next pages are based on the premise that an end to the PA's existence is not a necessity, but changes in its structure, functions, role, and policies are. Dissolving the PA would amount to an equal blow to Palestinian resilience as a collapse due to external forces would. With this in mind, it is clear that unless the PLO's role is revived and alternative central and dispersed bodies are established, vulnerabilities will mount, and the risk of chaos will remain.

POLITICAL PRIORITY 1: To rejuvenate, rebuild, and redefine a comprehensive Palestinian national project

Strategic goal

- Establishment of a shared Palestinian project creating a shared mission and vision for national institutions.

Required priority policies

- Reaching a comprehensive agreement of a program striving to realise the national goal of ending the occupation, achieving independence, and realising the right of return for refugees. This program is to be built on consensus – even if very basic – of Palestinian political and civil society actors. The program

and ensuing strategy are to be based on international law and address the conditions of all Palestinian communities in the homeland and abroad.

- Consensus on political partnership ensuring the reconstruction of the PLO and its institutions and the establishment of the PLO as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinians. The PLO is thus to represent all political actors, professional and sectoral unions, women, and the youth. This representative nature of the organisation calls for democratic elections, including a mechanism to allow the participation of Palestinians from the 1948 territories in national decision-making.
- Consensus regarding a comprehensive political and resistance strategy for the achievement of national objectives. Such a strategy should include the forms of resistance by peoples under occupation enshrined in international law and the specific circumstances of each Palestinian community inside the homeland and abroad.
- Restructuring and mobilising of the political levers of workers' unions and professional associations. These groups are to form the widest representative base within the PLO and their action and agendas are hence to be coordinated. In addition to labour unions, attention is to be placed on the activation of the role of students and student movements under the umbrella of the General Union of Palestinian Students. Measures to activate all unionised groups are to be coupled with frameworks ensuring periodic democratic elections.
- Coordination of the various community frameworks, such as institutions engaged in Palestinian issues abroad, and the merging or linking of them into the frameworks of the PLO.
- Restoring the PLO as the entity attending to the affairs and rights of Palestinian refugees and diaspora abroad.
- Coordination and unification of popular committees in refugee camps and the creation of action plans for the holding of elections for these committees in order to strengthen their role as representative and service-providing entities. This is to be supported by collaborations with UNRWA and the mobilization of international and Arab financing for the agency to ensure the delivery of services for Palestinian refugees.

Requirements for implementation

- Consensus on the principles of political partnership in and between the institutions of the PLO and PA, including consensus on the process of filling

power vacuums in the event of the president's absence from the political scene. This consensus is to be reached through a comprehensive, official or unofficial national dialogue between political forces, experts, and the private sector leading towards the formation of a national unity government.

- Formation of a preparatory committee facilitating the formation of the convention of a unified National Council on the basis of elections when possible and on the basis of consensus when not possible. These preparations are to be led by civil society actors within and beyond Palestine.
- Creation and roll-out of a mechanism allowing for the participation of Palestinians living in the 1948 territories in national decision-making. This work is to include and tap into the networks and resources of the Higher Follow-up Committee.

POLITICAL PRIORITY 2: Development of the function, mandate, budget, and political conduct of the PA as steering it towards an administrative and services providing entity and the transfer of the PA's political role to the PLO

Strategic goal

- Turning the PA into an efficient lever for achieving independence and liberation.

Required priority policies

- Ending of the political rift between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the achievement of a political and administrative union between the two. Integration of civilian and security institutions in the process of reshaping the PA in order to strengthen its role in administering the affairs of the Palestinian society. These developments are to be supported by the transfer of the political mandate of the PA to the PLO.
- Holding of legislative and presidential elections with due processes and ensuring that the occupation is not able to influence the conditions nor the results of the elections. The elections are to be the culmination of the reunification of institutions and their judicial apparatuses and made possible through the adoption of an electoral system that allows universal participation both for candidates and voters. The aim of the established

election mechanisms is to curb political monopolies through, for example, proportional representation.

- Adoption of a strategy with a genuine goal of dismantling the Oslo Accords and its addenda, escalating the resistance against occupation and Israel's settlement activity particularly in Jerusalem and Area C, and action to break the blockade of the Gaza Strip.
- Reviving of the political, national, and agenda-setting role of labour and professional unions, strengthening their independence, and democratic ways of working.
- Strengthening the participation of women in political life by implementing decisions set forth by the PLO regarding the proportion of women in national bodies and electoral lists as well as enhancing women's inclusion in decision-making roles in municipalities, local councils, and civil institutions. These efforts are to be amplified by programmes and campaigns to combat discrimination and gender inequality in all fields, including the media, education, and culture.
- Enable youth participation in political decision-making by expanding their participation in elections as candidates and voters and reintroducing political groups and activities into Palestinian universities. These dynamics are to take the shape of student movements that are to act as springboards for young leaders to politics.
- Ending policies of control perpetrated against civil society institutions and instead focusing on fostering political partnerships between these institutions in order to enable complementarity.
- Abidance to the rule of law by activating the role of the judiciary, and ending interventions from the executive authority in the formation of the Supreme Judicial Council.

Requirements for implementation

- Review of the doctrine, structure, and number of staff of the PA's establishment and security institutions.
- Establishment of a programme to address the impact of the occupation in Jerusalem, such as gaps in the provision of services. This programme is to be designed and implemented by civil society and private sector actors operating in Jerusalem.

- Change in the mechanisms of policy- and decision-making in the PA rendering them more democratic. This change can be accelerated through direct demands and pressure campaigns led by civil society and political groups targeting actors with decision-making power.
- Reconsideration of the security institution's doctrine, structure, and member figures.
- Establishment of a programme identifying the occupations impact in Jerusalem and the establishment of a national reference body to manage and coordinate acts of resistance and service provision in Jerusalem.
- Utilisation of the knowledge predating the existence of the PA and harnessing those insights to develop popular, protection, media, and service committees across the Palestinian territories and beyond, particularly in Jerusalem and areas facing the threat of annexation. Methods for the needed knowledge-gathering include solution and action-oriented workshops.
- Dismantling of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and transferring its political mandate to the PLO.
- Combatting corruption through the effective use of legally available tools. These efforts are to be led by the Anti-Corruption Commission and Palestinian legal institutions.
- Establishment of an overarching legal body comprising of institutions committed to the drafting of an action plan drawing a roadmap toward a unity government. The action plan is to enable the reunification and integration of civil institutions both in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
- Adoption of a plan to advocate for the lifting of the blockade on the Gaza Strip, addressing the mounting problems of the strip, and ending the policy of discrimination between Gaza and the West Bank. This plan is to be a joint effort led by the PA, all Palestinian political factions, and civil society actors.
- Unconditional respect for human rights and public freedoms as well as steps toward the reunification of the judiciary rendering it independent from executive power.

POLITICAL PRIORITY 3: Restoring the status of the Palestine cause as a priority at Arab and international levels

Strategic goal

- To make the Palestinian cause a priority among strategic and political actors with influence in Arab, regional, and international levels.

Recommended priority policies

- Adoption and rolling out of a strategy based on the Palestinian struggle to achieve national independence through the ending of the occupation and its colonialist settlements.
- Adoption of a political plan of action promoting cumulative changes in the balances of negotiating power to favour the Palestinian people. This strategy is to be based on the notion that a negotiated settlement as it stands and as a means of achieving national independence no longer exists.
- Restoration and strengthening of relations with political parties and civil society institutions in Arab, Islamic, and African countries in order to build consensus deterring further normalisations of relations with Israel.
- Expansion of the popular boycott of Israel, its goods, and services both on domestic as well as on international levels.
- Strengthening of the international dimensions of the Palestinian cause and struggle, supported by the activation of Palestinian membership in international institutions and courts.
- Continued pressure to persecute Israel and its leaders at the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice, or at courts in countries that have laws that permit such action.
- Building of a Palestinian narrative articulating the Palestinian cause, the unjust status quo, the resistance of the people against the occupation, and the struggles they face due to its racist policies.
- Emphasis on the vital importance of the right of return to the liberation struggle in order to benefit from existing experiences from the Marches of Return or similar protests and demonstrations. This is to act as a guiding notion in the design and implementation of plans to activate protest movements to defend

the right of return for all refugees living in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the 1948 territories, and in the diaspora. The plans to mobilise demands for the right of return are to include clauses specifically protecting and supporting the civilian and political rights of Palestinians and Palestinian communities living in the diaspora.

- Continued commitment to UNRWA's role, budget, and mandate in providing services to Palestinian refugees. Any attempts to reduce its services are to be rejected.
- Activation of Palestinian diplomacy as part of a permanent strategy to make the national goals of Palestine visible and heard.

Requirements for implementation

- Rejection of the framework of bilateral negotiations under the sponsorship of the US or the International Quartet consisting of the UN, US, EU, and Russia. This approach is to be based on abstinence from negotiations that do not fill the following criteria:
- Negotiations held in the framework of an international conference enjoying full powers and a sustainable standing;
- Commitment to the national rights of Palestinians;
- Convened under UN auspices;
- Based on the foundations of international law and resolutions.
- It is vital to note that the PLO and PA should have the full ability and capacity to call for such a conference.
- Dismantling of the liaison committee and reconstructing it in line with principles that guarantee a clear opposition to the occupation, settler colonialism, annexations, forced evictions, and racism.
- Rolling out of laws criminalising working in, dealing with, trading with, and investing in Israeli settlements.
- Calling for support for the Palestinian cause on the basis of international law and UN resolutions.
- Promotion of the role of Palestinian academics, activists, and researchers in popular diplomacy.

Economic Sphere:

Building an economy of resilience and resistance

The Palestinian economy is weak, volatile, and deeply defined by the status quo. The foundational attributes of the economy have been built under the occupation and as it stands, undermine Palestinian aspirations for independence and the ending of the occupation. The economy has been used to serve Israel's security as well as support its colonialist policies and the PA tasked to implement administrative, rather than sovereign tasks.

Due to ongoing roles and division of power, structural changes pushed by the occupying force affecting the Palestinian economy have led to the political, social, and cultural deterioration of Palestine. The impacts of these measures in the economic sphere have taken the shape of the shrinking of the middle class, rising unemployment, the prevalence of consumerism, the disintegration of the private sector, as well as the widening of the gap between regions, cities, social classes, and sectors.

Any attempt to end the intractable situation imposed by the Israeli economic hegemony—not least of which the Paris Economic Protocol—requires the adoption of an economic philosophy based on the notion that all forms of development are acts of resistance. This approach goes beyond regarding economic growth as state-building, even if within a subordinate system and without sovereignty over resources, and instead regards growth as a decisive act of resilience-building. Total economic independence or complete disengagement from the occupation is, as it stands, impossible.

Building an economy of resistance and reducing economic subservience is thus a priority and a key feature of the Enhanced Resilience Scenario. In order to enable an economy of resistance, the following goals are to be abided to:

1. Resilience-building that enables Palestinians to remain on their land;
2. Prioritisation of policies and initiatives confronting the occupation's practices and achieving self-sufficiency;
3. Creation of alternative growth and development trajectories that defy the fragmentation imposed by Israel.

In light of these goals, all recommended policies strive to enable growth, resilience, and resistance. The approach has several pre-requisites, foremost of which is the existence of Palestinian leadership capable of mobilising the public and the adoption of political and institutional reforms allowing change.

The most direly needed reforms are:

1. Ending compliance with the Paris Economic Protocol and avoiding its negative impact on the economy and society. As long as the protocol is in force, all approaches will remain subject to Israeli control.
2. Reconfiguration of the Palestinian budget and readjustments in its allocations in manners ensuring increased resources for marginalised sectors, such as agriculture and the development sectors, and a heightened focus on supporting small developmental projects and cooperatives, particularly those led by women and the youth.
3. Enactment of laws that support start-ups, such as tax exemptions, particularly in the case of projects relating to production and technology, as well as those relying on the engagement of the youth.
4. Incentivise for the Palestinian private sector to support innovative projects as well as clear approaches to end practices that perpetuate monopolies, low wages, and gender inequality.
5. Establishment of an official partnership framework that includes representatives from all relevant stakeholders active in building the national economy. The expansion of these partnerships should entail networking amongst universities, the private sector, and the government and encourage partnerships and trade exchange with Palestinian enterprises in the 1948 territories.
6. Systemic strategies to encourage investments from international Palestinian enterprises in Palestine enabling support for livelihood creating projects especially in refugee camps as well as the building of work-creating programmes leveraging opportunities between the homeland and Palestinian diaspora communities.

ECONOMIC PRIORITY 1: Supporting Palestinian citizens in enabling production and growth

Required policies

- Support for local productive sectors, particularly agriculture, and industry.
- Support for small enterprises and provisions of the necessary resources to enable success.

- Amendment of the minimum wage in a manner that reflects economic developments in Palestinian society.
- Wage increases in the private sector to reflect the standard of living.
- Ensuring job security for all genders.
- Adoption of economic policies that encourage exports and provide imported goods viable local alternatives.
- Enhancement of the PA's financial sustainability. These measures include insisting on the right to collect fees on the taxes now collected by Israel as well as further adjustments to the mechanisms of tax collection, such as, the revisiting of Israel's ability to control, transfer, and deduce from the funds it collects on behalf of the PA. These changes ensure that the PA is able to pay for the salaries of government workers, cover its operating expenses, provide liquidity to local markets, and pay outstanding fees to the private sector and banks.
- Economic empowerment of women by ensuring equal pay and providing them with the needed skills for career progression.
- Improvements in infrastructure in order to facilitate investments, particularly within the technology field.

Requirements for implementation

- Redistribution of the PA's budgetary allocations to support the agricultural sector and industrial projects.
- Adoption of a law introducing 10-year tax exemptions for small enterprises to match the one for large enterprises.
- Establishment of a fund in partnership with the PA, private enterprises, and employees to address unemployment and its negative effects.
- Adoption of supportive customs tariffs to strengthen local production.
- Reduction of the PA's expenditure, particularly operational expenditures, in order to adopt austerity measures and combat corruption.
- Setting up of a lending fund for small innovative projects. The fund is to receive contributions from individuals, banks, and donor countries.

ECONOMIC PRIORITY 2: The rebuilding of the Palestinian economic system and economic relations with the occupier

Strategic goal

- To strengthen the Palestinian economy's growth capabilities and reduce its subservience to the occupation.

Required policies

- Abandonment of the Paris Economic Agreement and related ties as well as policies imposed by Israel on Palestinian imports and exports.
- Ending economic policies led by a state-dominated approach favouring large enterprises. This will act as a step toward building an economy of resilience enabling the flourishing of small enterprises.
- Abandonment of economic policies encouraging imports and in turn prioritising Palestinian agricultural and industrial products also in government tenders.
- Professionalising national products and production in order to boost quality and competitiveness.
- Setting of official measures to boycott Israeli goods, particularly those produced in settlements.
- Activation of Palestinian economic partnerships with the Arab world.

Requirements for implementation

- Setting up industrial and trade zones and providing them with the necessary infrastructure to encourage investments.
- Adoption of an economic philosophy encouraging small sectors and mitigating the negative effects of free-market systems and neoliberal economy.
- Adoption of tax incentives to strengthen investment in local products.
- Implementation of the 2010 Palestinian law banning the sale of goods from Israeli settlements.
- Activation of the Arab Economic Integration Plan launched by the Palestinian Business Forum in 2015.

ECONOMIC PRIORITY 3: Economic resistance and rejection of economic peace approaches attempting to substitute national rights with economic growth

Strategic goal

- Resisting the economic implications of the annexation plan and economic peace approaches.

Required policies

- Direct and targeted support for citizens and farmers in the Jordan Valley in order to build their resilience.
- Encouragement of investment in Area C, particularly to small and family enterprises.
- Adoption of a strategy to gradually break free from the occupation and the systems of Israeli economic control.
- Support to boycott movements and other initiatives rejecting the occupation through economic means.
- Activation of Palestinian efforts to gain full membership at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and other international economic and trade forums.

Requirements for implementation

- Exemption of the inhabitants of the Jordan Valley from taxes and other fees as well as support to construction and agricultural project in the region.
- Direct support for civil society institutions to increase their activities and influence in Jerusalem and Area C, particularly in the Jordan Valley.
- Realistic implementation of the PA's intention to cancel the division of its territory into Area A, B, and C in the West Bank.
- Adoption of and support to the boycott movement.
- Awareness-building activities on the importance of boycott measures, coupled with the creation and rolling out of educational activities based on and carried out in collaborations with academic and research institutions.

ECONOMIC PRIORITY 4: Integrated management of the Palestinian economy

Strategic goal

- Activating the various agricultural, industrial, service, and social sectors to serve the Palestinian economy

Required policies

- Activation of the private sector's role in development processes.
- Establishment of an official partnership framework including representatives from all bodies active in building the national economy. These partnerships are to network with universities, the private sector, and the government to establish action plans for the better management of the Palestinian economy.
- Encouragement of investments from international Palestinian enterprises, coupled with the drafting of a vision and related programmes to create mutual benefits for Palestinians in the homeland and abroad.

Requirements for implementation

- Establishment of partnerships between international and domestic Palestinian enterprises so that both benefit from mutual capabilities, experiences, and opportunities.
- Broadening of the vocational, practical, and technological aspects and opportunities in Palestinian education to meet the needs and demands of the market.
- Creation and selling of government bonds targeting investors beyond Palestine. These bonds are to be known as liberation, resistance, and support bonds.

Social Sphere:

Policies to support the unity and harness the capacities of the Palestinian

The Palestinian people exist in three main communities:

1. Within 1948 Palestine,
2. In the diaspora, and
3. In the West Bank and Gaza.

The past decades have seen a deepening of fragmentation and division between these three communities, with the widest divide emerging between the diaspora and the Palestinians living in the 1948 territories. This physical, cultural, and political distance is the result of the PA's focus on Palestinians living under its authority and has resulted in the emergence of a wide diaspora representing an untapped resource. The Palestinian communities based in, for example, Europe and the Americas, have considerable potential that could be serviced for the Palestinian cause accessible either through social networks within these communities or through the networks of the next generation of Palestinian citizens.

The proposed social policies are based on two foundational factors:

1. The Palestinian people, wherever they exist, form a single unit and identity. Each of the sub-communities of this unit suffers from the consequences of the occupation, either due to forced evictions, being a refugee, structural racism, or other forms of oppression.
2. The majority of Palestinians do not participate in the drafting of the general policies affecting the Palestinian people. Large swathes of Palestinians are absent from the dialogues and decisions steering the future of the Palestinian cause.

In light of these factors, the social policies recommended in this document are based on the following goals:

- Building of a comprehensive national Palestinian identity in all Palestinian communities at home and abroad.
- Utilising Palestinian capacities to serve the national Palestinian project, without overlooking the problems of Palestinians in their respective communities.

- Enhancing partnerships with Arab and international social forces and institutions.
- Creation of institutions and programmes capable of integrating Palestinians living in the 1948 territories into the Palestinian national fabric.

SOCIAL POLICY PRIORITY 1: Building a comprehensive Palestinian national identity

Strategic goal

- Unifying the various groups, communities, and units of Palestinian people around a comprehensive national vision

Required policies

- Achievement of social security for Palestinians governed by the PA as well the Palestinians living in refugee camps home and abroad or in the 1948 territories. Emphasis is to be laid on maintaining and providing adequate living standards, combating crime and violence, and support all groups in resisting discriminatory policies.
- Establishment of a strategy that restores the notion of a Palestinian community, reducing tendencies towards individualism and enhancing agency for the common good.
- Adoption of national mobilisation and awareness programmes for the youth to incentivise and build their interest in national issues such as return and liberation. This will be coupled with addressing the causes that lead to immigration and other challenges faced by the generation.
- Adoption of awareness programmes to resist Israelization policies in Jerusalem.
- Adoption of a strategy of hope providing realistic solutions and a plan forward, given the daily despair Palestinians live with.

Requirements for implementation

- Adoption of a national political discourse based on the notion of ongoing national liberation. This discourse is to be strengthened and disseminated by the official and factional political elite.

- Adoption of policies based on social justice and individual and collective security.
- Adding emphasis on achievements to build hope and momentum. The media, the PA, and the private sector have a significant role to play in getting alternative narratives across to Palestinian audiences home and abroad.
- Support for schools that do not use Israeli curricula in Jerusalem through collaborations with civil society institutions.
- Channelling the resources and activities of civil society institutions to focus on large national issues.
- Building Palestinian institutions on democratic principles in order to render them representative of marginalised groups and act as mobilisers of these communities.

SOCIAL POLICY PRIORITY 2: Utilising the capacities of the Palestinian people in the service of the national project

Strategic goal

- A merging of Palestinian communities into an integrated national entity

Required policies

- Building a national strategy based on the diversity of strengths of Palestinian capabilities utilising the breadth of geographies, expertise, and generations in service of the Palestinian national project.
- Building a national Palestinian strategy through enhanced networks amongst Palestinian institutions in the 1967 and 1948 territories as well as abroad. These networks are to align cultural, aid, and charitable institutions to a common cause and goal.
- Building sectoral partnerships between Palestinian social actors at home as well as beyond to Arab and international actors.
- Encouraging institutions to draft and implement programmes that enable the integration of Palestinians living in the 1948 territories into the Palestinian national fabric.

Requirements for implementation

- Balancing and redefining the weight of the internal and external elements relevant for the Palestinian national movement and establishing a formula enhancing complementarity in roles and responsibilities.
- Rebuilding of the structures of the PLO and its frameworks to encompass the entire Palestinian people.
- Drafting and rolling out of a national strategy to end the occupation and its effects globally.
- Launch of a comprehensive national dialogue with the potential of turning into or enabling institutional activity and change.

CONCLUSION

Resilience is not an end in itself. It is a means to an end. This is the key message underscored in all the recommendations laid out in this document. The act of strengthening resilience is an act of strengthening the capacity of Palestinians to achieve the goals of national liberation and self-determination. This is not an individual struggle. It is an institutional, structural, and shared effort of resisting the occupation and its effects within the Palestinian homeland as well as beyond its immediate borders.

The document began with a deep-dive into the status quo, then expanded on the risks tied to a collapse, and closed with an overview of the roadmap leading towards enhanced resilience and unity. A key factor underscored across the scenarios is that the notion of complementarity. Resilience relies on the interplay of all Palestinian sectors, be they official institutions responsible for high-level decision-making or grassroots actors working within communities. This complementarity relies on national unity and the will to build bridges between divisions. These bridges in turn rest on a shared political vision and agenda taking into account the democratic voices of the Palestinian people.

Resilience is not a synonym for acceptance. It is a synonym for resistance. This document is an outcome of a process seeking to build a national movement guided by a vision of unity within a democratic, pluralist political system manifesting in an inclusively crafted national programme. This document is a tool drafted for Palestine by Palestinians mapping the path toward the realisation of that vision.

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